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Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice
Aziz Z. Huq*
(forthcoming, 68 Duke Law Journal – (2019))
Abstract
Algorithmic tools for predicting violence and criminality are being
increasingly used in policing, bail, and sentencing. Scholarly attention to
date has focused on their procedural due process implications. My aim here
is to consider these instruments’ interaction with the enduring racial
legacies of the criminal justice system. There are two competing lenses for
evaluating the racial effects of algorithmic criminal justice: constitutional
doctrine and emerging technical standards of “algorithmic fairness.” I
argue first that constitutional doctrine is poorly suited to the task. It will
often fail to capture the full range of racial issues that potentially arise in
the use of algorithmic tools in criminal justice. While the emerging
technical standards of algorithmic fairness are at least fitted to the specifics
of the relevant technology, the technical literature has failed to ask how
various conceptions of fairness track (or fail to track) policy-significant
consequences. Drawing on the technical literature, I propose a
reformulated metric for considering racial equity concerns in algorithmic
design. Rather than asking about abstract definitions of fairness, a criminal
justice algorithm should be evaluated in terms of its long-term, dynamic
effects on racial stratification. The metric of nondiscrimination for the
algorithmic context should focus on the net burden placed on a racial
minority. A precise formulation of this metric suggests that it can converge
with the socially efficient decision rule under certain conditions.

* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks in
particular to Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, and Sam Corbett-Davies for their help over several conversations,
in which they patiently explained the interaction of machine learning and statistical concepts to me. Emily
Berman, Vincent Chiao, Jessica Clarke, Nancy King, Kiel Brennan Marquez, Debbie Hellman, Andrew
Selbst, Chris Slobogin all gave me helpful comments that improved my thinking and corrected my errors. I
was also helped greatly by workshops at Vanderbilt Law School, Northwestern Law School, and the
University of Toronto Law School. Faith Laken provided terrific research assistance. All errors remain my
own.
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Introduction
From the cotton gin to the camera phone, new technologies have scrambled,
invigorated, and refashioned the terms on which the state coerces. Today, we are in the
midst of another major reconfiguration. Police, criminal courts, and parole boards across
the country are turning to sophisticated algorithmic instruments to guide decisions about
the ‘where,’ ‘whom,’ and ‘when’ of law enforcement.1 The new predictive algorithms trawl
immense quantities of data, exploit massive computational power, and leverage new
machine-learning technologies to generate predictions no human could conjure. These
tools are likely to have enduring effects on the criminal justice system. Yet law remains far
behind in thinking through the difficult questions that arise when machine learning
substitutes for human discretion.
My aim in this Article is to isolate one important design margin for evaluating
algorithmic criminal justice: the effect of algorithmic criminal justice tools on racial equity.
I use this capacious term to capture the complex ways in which the state’s use of a
technology can implicate normative and legal concerns related to racial dynamics. The
Article considers a number of ways in which legal scholars and computer scientists have
theorized race. It evaluates these distinct approaches in terms of the way in which criminal
justice in practice interacts with racial patterning. A primary lesson concerns the parameter
that best captures racial equity concerns in an algorithmic setting. A secondary lesson
relates to the fit between problems of race in the algorithmic context on the one hand, and
legal or technical conceptions of equality on the other.
‘Racial equity’ merits a discrete, detailed inquiry given the fraught racial history of
American criminal justice institutions. Since the turn of the twentieth century, public
arguments about criminality have been entangled, often invidiously, with generalizations
about race and the putative criminality of racial minorities.2 Today, pigmentation remains
de facto a proxy for criminality; that proxy distorts everything from residential patterns to
labor market opportunities.3 Police respond to black and white suspects in different ways.4

1

Reed E. Hundt, Making No Secrets About It, 10 IS J. L. & POL. 581, 588 (2014) (“[The G]overnment now
routinely asks computers to suggest who has committed crimes.”).
2
KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (exploring the ways in which at the beginning of the twentieth century,
policymakers in Northern cities began linking crime to African-Americans on the basis of genetic and
predispositional arguments).
3
See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the
Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319-20 (2004) (finding that
perceptions of disorder in a neighborhood were better predicted by the racial composition of a
neighborhood than by actual disorder); Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black neighbors, higher crime?
The role of racial stereotypes. 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 718 (2001) (finding “that the percentage of a
neighborhood’s black population, particularly young black men, is significantly associated with perceptions
of the severity of a neighborhood’s crime problems”).
4
For evidence, see CHARLES EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED
OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 32-33 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences
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So do judges and prosecutors.5 Partly as a result of these dynamics, roughly one in three
black men (and one in five Latino men) will be incarcerated during their lifetime.6 At the
same time, the criminal justice system imposes substantial socioeconomic costs on
minority citizens not directly touched by policing or prosecutions. In particular, minority
children of the incarcerated bear an unconscionable burden as a result of separation from
their parents. 7 More generally, there is substantial evidence that spillover costs of
producing public safety fall disproportionately on minority groups.8 As a result, criminal
justice shapes racial stratification.9 Such downstream consequences of existing criminaljustice institutions raise weighty moral and legal questions.10 Even if one demurs to the
analogy commonly drawn between our criminal justice system and early twentieth-century
debt peonage,11 I think it is clear that the criminal justice system is an institution in which
racial identity has meaningful effects, and that these in turn have influences on the role of
race in larger American society.12
To sharpen this point, it is useful to have at hand two examples of how new
technologies can prompt debates about racial equity. I present the first at greater length
because it has become a focal point in public debates. First, the Compas software
application, created by the Northpointe Institution for Public Management, is used from
Florida to Wisconsin to inform bail and parole decisions. Compas is organized around an
algorithm that uses the answers to some 137 questions about a criminal suspect to rank
them on a scale of 1 to 10. This scale is supposed to capture the suspect’s risk of reoffending
of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk As A Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV.
2397, 2408 (2017) [hereinafter “Huq, Disparate Policing”] (discussing evidence of such disparities).
5
For two different perspectives, emphasizing intentional bias and disparate racial impacts, see Sonja B.
Starr & Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and
the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 25-30 (2013) (documenting racial disparities in federal
prosecutorial charging decisions related to the application of mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases);
Richard Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota's Prison and Jail
Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 265 (2009) (finding that “seemingly legitimate sentencing factors
such as criminal history scoring can have strongly disparate impacts on nonwhite defendants”).
6
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 31-39 (2006) (describing the growth of the
incarcerated population over time, and describing racial inequalities); Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and
Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 44 CRIME & JUST. 49, 55 (2015) (noting that in
2001 “the chances of ever going to prison were highest among black males (32.2 percent) and Hispanic
males (17.2 percent)”).
7
See SARA WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE PRISON BOOM: MASS
INCARCERATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY 41 (2014) (discussing the racially disparate
spillover effects of incarceration).
8
Id.
9
For a synoptic view of this claim that is dated, but still insightful, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME,
AND THE LAW (1997).
10
I think it is important for legal scholars to be candid in distinguishing their normative judgments from
their analytic, doctrinal, and empirical claims. The following paragraph states my normative position; it is a
premise of what follows, not a conclusion I seek to defend here. See also supra Part III.A (further
defending this position).
11
See, e.g., MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). For nuanced criticism of Alexander’s paradigm, James Forman, Jr., Racial
Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 42-43 (2012).
12
James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. L. ANALYSIS 119,
122 (2009).
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and violent recidivism. 13 Higher scores indicate a greater risk of recidivism. In 2016,
journalists from the Pro Publica organization did a quantitative analysis of Compas scores
for roughly ten thousand people arrested and evaluated in Broward County, Florida. By
comparing Compas scores to a person’s behavior in the following two years, Pro Publica
was able to evaluate the instrument’s accuracy, and in particular to investigate whether it
had differential effects on different racial groups.
Pro Publica concluded that the Compas instrument correctly predicted recidivism
rates 61 percent of the time, and violent recidivism rates 21 percent of the time.14 Pro
Publica also concluded that the algorithm “was particularly likely to falsely flag black
defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as
white defendants.” 15 To reach this conclusion, Pro Publica isolated the group of black
suspects who had not reoffended in the two years following their evaluation. It found that
45 percent of that group was labeled high risk by the algorithm.16 Pro Publica then looked
at the group of white suspects who had not reoffended, and found that only 23 percent of
that group had been labeled high risk. In other words, the ratio of false positives to true
negatives within the pool of ‘innocent’ defendants was higher for blacks than for whites.17
Correspondingly, Pro Publica also found that the ratio of false negatives to true positives
was lower for whites than for blacks.18
Not surprisingly, the company responded by sharply contesting Pro Publica’s
analysis. Northpointe data scientists insisted that Compas was well-calibrated in the sense
that a white and a black defendant assigned the same risk score were equally likely to
recidivate.19 This constituted evidence, the company argued, that where it mattered to the
imposition of state coercion (i.e., where there was a prediction of high risk), the Compas
13

For descriptions of the Compas algorithm, see Northpointe, Practitioners Guide to COMPAS 17 (2012),
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/FieldGuide2_081412.pdf.[https://perma.cc/4FX
T-6U9M]; see also In re Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1037-38 (3d Dep't 2016) (describing the
COMPAS assessment tool).
14
Jeff Larsen et al., How we Analyzed the Compas Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. Note that rates of
violent crime tend to be so low that an ‘accurate’ instrument would be one that simply classified everyone
as low risk.
15
Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There's Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future
Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing/. Pro Publica
treated ‘medium’ and ‘high’ risk rankings as higher risk.
16
Larsen et al., supra note 14. This disparity remained once Pro Publica controlled for “prior crimes, future
recidivism, age, and gender.” Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
William Dietrich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity,
Northpointe Inc. Research Department, July 8, 2016, at 3
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2998391-ProPublica-Commentary-Final-070616.html
(flagging “equal discriminative ability” of the algorithm for blacks and whites); see also Anthony W.
Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: There’s
Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And it’s Biased Against Blacks,” 80 FED
PROBATION 34, 35 (2016) (describing the Pro Publica analysis as “faulty”). For a different result using a
reconstruction of the Compas algorithm, see Razieh Nabi & Ilya Shpitser, Fair inference on outcomes, 8
(2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10378.
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algorithm had equal error rates across groups. In addition, Northpointe made a number of
(contested) technical complaints about Pro Publica’s analysis, related to the way it
accounted for base recidivism rates and how it cut its sample between low and high risk
defendants.20 These complaints lacked the force of Northpointe’s central claim—that its
risk predictions were equally accurate where it counted regardless of race. This dialogue
was not the end of the matter. Other analysts raised a cautionary flag to warn against
accepting the terms of the debate as framed by Pro Publica and Northpointe: Something
more complex, they worried, seemed at stake, although they did not explain fully how the
debate should be settled.21 As a result, debate on Compas—and in particular the question
of which measure of fairness should be used to evaluate a predictive algorithm—persists
as a locus for normative concern.
A second example of the race-related questions potentially raised by algorithmic
criminal justice arises in the policing context, where officers are increasingly using such
tools in determining where to deploy and who to apprehend.22 In Chicago, police faced
with a wave of deadly street violence23 have deployed a “Strategic Subjects List,” or SSL.
This is an algorithm developed by data scientists at the Illinois Institute of Technology
using U.S. Department of Justice funds.24 The SSL ranks individuals known to police for
the risk of involvement in a shooting using eight data points.25 Its aim, according to the
chief of organizational development for the department, was “to figure out now … how
does that data inform what happens in the future.” 26 Yet despite the fact that the SSL
algorithm explicitly accounted for neither race nor gender,27 interventions based on SSL
were quickly lambasted for focusing solely on African-American men.28 Other algorithms
20

Dietrich et al., supra note 19, at 32-33.
See, e.g., Avi Feller et al., A computer program used for bail and sentencing decisions was labeled
biased against blacks. It’s actually not that clear, WASH. POST, Oct 16, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-ouranalysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/?utm_term=.f8164ea2cd2c; Matthias Spielkamp, Inspecting
Algorithms for Bias, MIT TECH. REV., Jun 17, 2017,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/607955/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias/. For my analysis of the
Compas algorithm, see text accompanying infra notes 325 to 328.
22
Mara Hvistendahl, Can ‘predictive policing’ prevent crime before it happens?, SCIENCE, Sept. 28, 2016,
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-prevent-crime-it-happens (noting the
adoption of policing tools “which incorporate everything from minor crime reports to criminals' Facebook
profiles”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 1109,
1122-44 (2017) (providing a careful catalogue of predictive policing tools).
23
Monica Davey, Chicago Tactics Put a Major Dent in Killing Trend, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A1.
24
City of Chicago, Strategic Subjects List: Public Safety, Dec. 7, 2017,
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Strategic-Subject-List/4aki-r3np.
25
Id.
26
Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use “Heat List” As Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21,
2013, http:// articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-20130821_1_ chicago-policecommander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list.
27
Other predictive policing instruments, however, do explicitly account for suspects’ race. David Robinson
& Logan Koepke, Upturn, Stuck in a Pattern: Early Evidence on “Predictive Policing” and Civil Rights 45 (2016), https://www.teamupturn.com/static/reports/2016/predictive-policing/files/Upturn__Stuck_In_a_Pattern_v.1.01.pdf.
28
Matt Stoudt, The minority report: Chicago's new police computer predicts crimes, but is it racist?, THE
VERGE, Feb. 14, 2014, https://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minority-report-this-computerpredicts-crime-but-is-it-racist.
21
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used to guide the allocation of policing resources on geographic rather than individual
terms have elicited kindred concerns about racial targeting.29
Questions about algorithmic criminal justice are poised to become more complex.
Compas and the SSL are both quite straightforward instruments. Each applies a fixed
regression equation with a limited array of parameters to a static data set. Advances in what
is called machine learning, however, will soon render this sort of tool passé. Machine
learning is a “general purpose”30 technology that, in broad terms, encompasses “algorithms
and systems that improve their knowledge or performance with experience.” 31 A
supervised machine-learning instrument—the species of machine learning likely most
relevant in the criminal justice space32—begins with a so-called training set of examples
that are ‘labeled’ with some parameter values. The algorithm examines relations between
various aspects of those examples to develop a wholly new criterion to classify new
examples. 33 Unlike more familiar econometric tools such as regression analysis, a
supervised machine learning process classifies on the basis of rules that the algorithm itself
has developed. Refining this process, deep learning tools deploy “multilayered” processes,
account for billions of data points, and constantly adjust their classification rule.34 Machine
learning is now being deployed, for instance, in Cambridge, MA, to predict house
burglaries,35 and in Durham, England, to predict individual recidivism.36 Deep learning is
used in facial recognition and machine translation; it will likely find new uses as its
29

Justin Jouvenal, Police are Using Software to Predict Crime. Is it a ‘Holy Grail’ or Biased Against
Minorities?, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/police-areusing-software-to-predict-crime-is-it-a-holy-grail-or-biased-against-minorities/2016/11/17/525a6649-0472440a-aae1-b283aa8e5de8_story.html?utm_term=.72a9d2eb22ae.
30
Erik Brynjolfsson and Tom Mitchell, What can machine learning do? Workforce implications, SCIENCE,
Dec. 22, 2017, http://science.sciencemag.org/content/358/6370/1530.full.
31
PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF
DATA 3 (2012); ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE LEARNING 2 (3d ed. 2014); see also text
accompanying infra notes 73 to 82 for a fuller account of machine learning, and text accompanying infra
notes 84 to 88 for a discussion of deep learning.
32
Susan Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using Big Data for Policy Problems, SCIENCE, Feb 3, 2017, at 483,
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/355/6324/483.full (noting the use of structured machine learning to
solve prediction problems).
33
M. I. Jordan & T. M. Mitchell, Machine learning: Trends, perspectives, and prospects, SCIENCE, Jul. 17,
2015, at 255 (defining supervised learning as a process in which “the training data take the form of a
collection of (x, y) pairs and the goal is to produce a prediction y* in response to a query x*”); Athey,
supra note 32, at 483 (explaining that machine learning “programs take as input training data sets and
estimate or ‘learn’ parameters that can be used to make predictions on new data); Comm. on the Analysis
of Massive Data et al., Frontiers in Massive Data Analysis 104 (2013),
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18374 (noting that in supervised learning, the analyst must
actively specify a variable of interest).
34
Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 33, at 256. Deep learning uses a process called stochastic gradient ascent
to improve predictive quality continuously. Yann Le Cuan et al., Deep Learning, 521 SCIENCE 436, 437
(2015).
35
Cynthia Rudin, Predictive Policing: Using Machine Learning to Detect Patterns of Crime, WIRED, Aug.
2013, https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/08/predictive-policing-using-machine-learning-to-detectpatterns-of-crime/.
36
Chris Baraniuk, Durham Police AI to help with custody decisions, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2017
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39857645; see infra Part I.C for a catalog of more examples of how
machine learning is used in the criminal justice context.
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capabilities are further explored. My use of the term “algorithmic criminal justice” is
intended to capture both existing instruments such as Compas and the SSL, and also
machine learning (including deep learning) tools that are likely to be deployed for
prediction purposes in the future. Such synoptic consideration is warranted because all
these tools leverage historical data to generate ‘predictions’ for new, out-of-sample data.37
Algorthmic tools in criminal justice warrant distinct treatment because they are a
new technology that is likely to become pervasive in respect to which normative intuitions
remain inchoate and hence malleable. They also represent a qualitative change from the
crude evaluative tools embodied in present bail and sentencing practices. These build on
imprecise measures of recividism risk, fail to account for immediate or downstream costs,
and cannot be calibrated with the precision of emerging tools. The precision enabled by
the algorithmic turn pries open a substantively new domain of policy-design possibilities.
There are, very generally stated, two distinct analytic frameworks in use now for
evaluating the racial effects on machine-learning tools in criminal justice. The first derives
from constitutional law. The second is derived from the computer-science literature on
algorithm design.38 Both, in my view, fall short. The constitutional law of racial inequality
directs attention to trivial or irrelevant design margins. It is at times counterproductive. In
contrast, technical discussions of algorithmic fairness have yielded an array of parameters
that capture different elements of an algorithm’s operation. But as the debate between Pro
Publica and Northpointe shows, the computer-science literature has generated no clear
consensus about which parameter matters. This Article fills the gap left by the irrelevance
of constitutional law and the under-theorization of computer-science. It offers a novel,
normatively grounded, and empirically pertinent framework for thinking about racial
equity in this emerging technological context.39
Consider first the current constitutional framework for the regulation of race effects
in policing. The doctrine, in rough paraphrase, has two main prongs. One concern in the
jurisprudence turns on the use of “racial stereotypes or animus” held by individual actors.40
A focus on animus or stereotypes, though, doesn’t easily translate into contexts in which
an algorithm blends data streams to estimate unknown parameter values. At best, a concern
with intent captures a subset of problematic cases in which data inputs are tainted. Second,
Equal Protection law is also concerned with the use of racial classifications. But in the
emergent context of algorithmic criminal justice, where decision rules are computed
37

I use the term prediction not because all these instruments aim at the future. Rather, the term captures the
possibility that one data set will be used to generate an instrument for drawing inferences about a different
sample of data. It is a prediction in the sense of being an out-of-sample estimate.
38
I will not work through all of the relevant computer science literature here. For a brief survey that
touches on some of the questions analyzed here, see Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 633, 682-90 (2017).
39
To the extent that algorithmic tools are more generally replacing diffused human discretion, my
reconceptualization of equality norms may have more general application.
40
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); see also Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory
Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. --, at 10-21 (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter “Huq, Discriminatory Intent”],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033169 (analyzing the central role of intent in the
context of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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endogenously from historical data and then applied without being broadcast to the public,
the expressive or distortive harms of racial classifications may well not be present. Crudely
stated, an algorithm’s use of racial data is unlikely to stigmatize or otherwise impose any
harm putatively linked to the use of suspect classifications. Eliminating such criteria,
moreover, can leave actual outcomes unchanged. Worse, it can generate needless publicsafety-related costs. This is because algorithmic use of a proscribed criterion, such as race,
might in some instances improve the quality of predictions. Thinking about Equal
Protection jurisprudence in relation to algorithmic criminal justice therefore suggests that
the former is not a coherent or morally acute metric.
If constitutional law provides no creditable guidance, what about the burgeoning
computer-science scholarship on “algorithmic fairness” and “algorithmic discrimination,”
terms to date used to cover a number of different means of evaluating predictive tools?41
At a very high level of abstraction, the technical literature usefully distinguishes between
two different ways in which race effects might emerge in algorithmic criminal justice. The
first is the use of racially tainted historical data to build an algorithm. For example, a
policing algorithm used to predict who will be involved in crime, such as SSL, might
employ data gathered by police, such as records of past street stops or past arrests. If the
pattern of this historical policing activity is informed by racial considerations, then the
algorithm’s predictions will be accordingly skewed. Fixing this first problem of polluted
training data is straightforward. As several legal scholars have noted, algorithms can
simply be constructed without tainted training data. 42 Whatever difficulties this might
present in terms of implementation, it raises no great theoretical impediment.
But the second way in which a racial problem can arise from the use of algorithmic
tools does.43 It turns on the possibility that an algorithm will generate patterns of error that
are systematically skewed between racial groups. As the debate between Pro Publica and
Northpointe illustrates, however, there is more than one way of measuring errors, and more
than one way of thinking about racial skewing. Indeed, the computer science literature has
generated an embarrassment of possible metrics. Simplifying this literature by stripping
away redundant and irrelevant conceptual trappings, I suggest that an analysis of racial
equity might focus on one of four different parameters.
One might first simply look at whether equal fractions of each racial group are
labeled as risky—such that they will be subject to additional policing or detention. Where
risk is measured as a continuous variable, this would mean looking at whether the average
risk scores of different racial groups varied. Second, one might ask whether the same
41

See infra Part II for a survey of the relevant work.
See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 38, at 680 (“[A]lgorithms that include some type of machine learning
can lead to discriminatory results if the algorithms are trained on historical examples that reflect past
prejudice or implicit bias”); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039
(2017) (same); Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html
(same).
43
Kroll et al., recognize that “machine learning models can build in discrimination through choices in how
models are constructed.” Kroll et al., supra note 38, at 681. This is not, however, the central focus of their
wide-ranging and useful analysis.
42
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classification rule is being used to assign racial groups to the high-risk category. This
condition is satisfied if the same numerical risk score is used as a cut-off for all groups.
Third, one might separate each racial group and then look at the rate of false positives
conditional on being categorized as high risk. That is, one could examine the rate of false
positives conditional on being identified as risky. This is the parameter that Northpointe
stressed. And fourth, one might separate each racial group and ask how frequently false
positives are conditional on being in fact a low risk person. This is the parameter Pro
Publica underscored.
Each of these metrics tracks a subtly different conception of nondiscrimination. So
which fits best a normatively relevant conception of racial equity? The question is
complicated by two considerations. First, there is an irreconcilable tension between the first
and second criteria. If the average risk score of two racial groups diverge, it is not possible
to use the same classification rule and also to ensure that an equal fraction of each group is
categorized as high risk. The same risk threshold applied to different populations, that is,
yields different results. Second, computer-science scholars (in collaboration with legal
scholars, including myself) have developed in the past two years an impossibility result
concerning the third and fourth metrics. Under most empirically plausible conditions, a risk
instrument cannot satisfy both the third and the fourth criterion. That is, if the proportion
of false positives as a fraction of all positives is equalized between races, then the ratio of
low-risk individuals subject to coercion will diverge between the two groups. There is
hence an irreconcilable tension in many states of the world between having equally
accurate predictions of high risk and equalizing the rates of false positives within the pool
of ‘innocent’ suspects.
To prioritize between these conceptions of racial equity, it is necessary to elaborate
an account of the normative stakes of racial equity in criminal law. In the ordinary course,
we might look to constitutional law to this end. But we have already seen that constitutional
law does not provide a fit and tractable frame for analysis. I thus return to first principles.
In my view, the primary reason for concern with racial equity in the algorithmic criminal
justice context is that efforts to suppress crime entrench wider social patterns of racial
stratification. In important part, stratification effects arise because of the asymmetrical
spillovers from criminal justice for minority but not majority populations. A parameter for
measuring racial equity, therefore, should be selected on the ground that it captures this
causal effect of criminal justice on racial stratification.
An algorithm that recommends coercion for a member of the subordinated racial
group at the margin when it is not justified in terms of benefits to that racial group will
likely increase racial stratification. When coercion of the marginal minority group member
is unjustified, it imposes a net burden on the minority group, compounding social
stratification. Further, if the majority group does not benefit from the policy, or if its net
gain is less than the costs imposed on the minority group, that policy is also socially
inefficient.44 I suspect that governments often over-estimate the crime-suppression benefits
44

Only if the gains to a majority group exceed the costs to a minority group is there a tension between
efficiency and racial equity. As I explain below, I think it is plausible to prioritize equality norms in many
of these conflicts.
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of coercive actions while underestimating their costs. Racial equity is therefore served in
the first instance today by ratcheting coercion down to socially optimal levels,45 and then
by selecting for criminal justice tools that do not burden minority groups.
In designing an algorithm, this intuition must be translated into instructions for the
classification protocol. This should be done differently for serious and less serious crime.
For serious violent and property crime, the most important costs and benefits of crime (and
crime prevention) accrue directly to the perpetrator and the victim. Spillovers are by
comparison small. In these conditions, a single, socially optimal classification rule will
advance racial equity and satisfy an efficiency criterion. Rates of false positives,
underscored by Pro Publica and Northpointe, are less relevant. For less serious crimes and
misdemeanors, however, empirical evidence studies identify large spillover costs
asymmetrically imposed on minority but not majority communities. At the margin, these
spillovers mean that coercion of the minority is both less likely to be efficient and more
likely to generate racial stratification. Accordingly, a bifurcated classification rule
employing different risk thresholds for stratified racial groups is appropriate to account for
asymmetrical spillovers.
Such binary thresholds will be socially efficient and racially just, but face practical
and legal hurdles. First, evaluating algorithmic tools in light of social externalities will
require much more information about downstream costs than is presently available.
Governments have been woefully deficient in collecting such data; present “risk
assessment” instruments embody information about recidivism risk, but neither the direct
nor the indirect costs of criminal justice coercion.46 There is a large epistemic void here
that scholars can fill, and it is possible that other big-data tools will be important in this
regard. Second, the use of racially bifurcated thresholds would raise constitutional concerns
akin to those engendered by affirmative action programs. To the extent current doctrine
mandates an outcome that is both socially inefficient and also racially iniquitous, it is
legally and morally indefensible.
Some limitations on my analysis in this Article should be demarcated up front. First,
I should again underscore that the costs and benefits of algorithmic tools vary depending
on where in the criminal justice process they are deployed. My aim here is to set out a
general framework and not to pass judgment on any particular computational tool. Second,
this Article does not address the integration of algorithmic outputs into individualized
suspicion determinations under the Fourth Amendment47 or the issues related to procedural
45

In using the terms “social efficiency,” I mean to capture a static (and in my view naïve) account of
welfare that looks only to proximate costs and benefits. It is my view that racial stratification is plausibly
described as an ‘inefficient’ equilibrium to the extent that it dissipates large amounts of human capital
while inflicting onerous psychological and stigmatic burdens. But since my view is not orthodox, I do not
insist on it here and instead use “efficiency” in its more common sense.
46
Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO J. CRIM. L. 583,
583 (2018).
47
The best works include Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of
Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2017) (arguing that for predictions to be used as a basis
for searches under the Fourth Amendment, they have to be “intelligible,” in the sense of being amenable to
explanation), Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
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due process rights from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.48 These constitutional rules
engage different elements of algorithm design. For example, an important recent article
develops a concept of “procedural regularity” to ensure that algorithmic decisions are
“made using consistently applied standards and practices.”49 This is an important concern.
But it is distinct from racial equity. I also do not address the statutory standard supplied by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which has been the lens of other recent work on
algorithmic justice. 50 Nor do I address algorithms’ use outside the criminal justice
context.51
Finally, one prominent article examines the racial effects of a larger class of
“evidence based” predictive instruments. It condemns those instruments in general, arguing
that they elicit “overt discrimination based on demographics and socioeconomic status.”52
Its legal analysis is premised on the dubious proposition that “[c]urrent” constitutional law
“calls into serious question the variables related to socioeconomic status, such as
employment status, education, income, dependence on government assistance, and job
skills.”53 I am not convinced this is an accurate statement of current law; my analysis thus
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 929 (2016) (developing a “framework” for integrating machinelearning technologies into Fourth Amendment analysis), and Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 383-84 (2015). Judicial consideration of this
issue has been limited. Cf. Commonwealth v. Smith, 709 S.E.2d 139, 143 (Va. 2011) (relying on
constructive knowledge doctrine to allow officer use of a predictive algorithm in a Terry stop).
48
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1256-57 (2008)
(criticizing the “crudeness” of then-extant algorithms, and urging greater opportunities for individual
challenges).
49
Kroll et al., supra note 38, at 637-38. For another argument focused on process, see Kate Crawford &
Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55
B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 (2014) (arguing for “procedural data due process [to] regulate the fairness of Big
Data’s analytical processes with regard to how they use personal data (or metadata …) in any adjudicative
process”).
50
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 694-712
(2016) (examining “[l]iability under Title VII for discriminatory data mining [which] will depend on the
particular mechanism by which the inequitable outcomes are generated.”); accord Kroll et al., supra note
38, at 692-95.
51
In addition, there is a small body of insightful popular literature about the distributive effects of
algorithmic instruments more generally. See CATHY O’NEILL, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 202-206 (2016) (decrying the regressive
tendencies of big-data technologies generally); accord VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY:
HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018) (same).
52
Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66
STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014). One other article contains the glib assertion that “if racial and ethnic
variables significantly improved the predictive validity of risk-needs models, then including them would
appear to be narrowly tailored to the government's compelling interests.” Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs
Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 259 (2015). Hamilton
equates ‘narrow tailoring’ with ‘minimal efficacy.’ She fails to meaningfully grapple with existing
precedent. And she is opaque as to what kind of race effects might have legal or normative significance.
Her analysis is thus quite limited. Finally, a brief 2016 article suggests that the application of certain
algorithmic tools in a sentencing context might violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. Gregory Cui, EvidenceBased Sentencing and the Taint of Dangerousness, 125 YALE L.J. F. 315 (2016).
53
Starr, supra note 52, at 830. Starr also argues that evidence-based methods do worse in sheer accuracy
terms than readily available alternatives such as clinical assessments. Id. at 842-62. This is also orthogonal
to my analysis here.
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proceeds on the basis of different doctrinal predicates. In any case, the earlier article does
not explicate carefully both the costs and benefits of algorithmic criminal justice.54 A more
meticulous approach is needed that disaggregates possible technological approaches and
normative effects.
The Article unfolds in three steps. Part I defines algorithmic criminal justice and
illustrates it by isolating discrete clusters of related instruments now employed in criminal
justice or likely soon to be used. I also supply non-technical exposition of the relevant
technologies. Part II explores legal criteria of racial equity with special attention to the
Equal Protection Clause. It identifies deficiencies in that framework as it applies to
algorithmic criminal justice. Part III then turns to the nascent computer-science literature
on technical standards of fairness for algorithmic criminal justice. I begin by articulating a
normative account of racial equity concerns in criminal justice. I then work through the
various metrics identified in the literature to measure racial equity, as well as the tensions
between those metrics. Finally, I set forth my own account of racial equity, and explain
how it can be operationalized—both in theory and in practice.
I.

Algorithmic Criminal Justice: Scope and Operation

Predictive criminal justice was old when Captain Renault told his men in
Casablanca to “round up the usual suspects.”55 The meaningful use of “criminal justice
determinations that do not rest simply on probabilities but on statistical correlations
between group traits and group criminal-offending rates” can be traced back to the
beginning of the twentieth century. 56 The resulting profusion of predictive instruments
extends well beyond algorithmic criminal justice instruments to be considered here. For
example, an array of evidence-based interventions from interviews to actuarial scoring
have long been employed in the sentencing context.57
To sharpen the ensuing analysis, I think it is useful to define with some precision a
discrete domain of practices as “algorithmic criminal justice.” This Part offers such a
54

Starr notes that “[t]here appears to be a general consensus that using race would be unconstitutional,” id.
at 812, but this assertion is not based on a comprehensive appreciation of the ways in which racial effects
might be embedded in, or emerge from, algorithmic instruments.
55
CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (“[P]rediction of
future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal
justice system.”).
56
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL
AGE 18 (2007); see also Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157,
176-77 (2013) (“Criminal justice actors often predict which defendants are going to commit an additional
crime in determining whether to arrest defendants, to release them on bail, or to release them on parole, or
in determining their sentence. This prediction is often based not only on individual evaluation, but also on a
group's criminality and past behavior.”); Richard Berk, Forecasting Methods in Crime and Justice, 4 ANN.
REV. LAW AND SOC. SCI. 219, 221-23 (2008) (setting out the history of formal crime prediction models).
57
Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
537, 539 (2015) (discussing “the use of actuarial risk and need assessment instruments, motivational
interviewing and counseling techniques, deterrence-based sanction programs, and incentives to
probationers and parolees for successful compliance with court orders” with attention to their effects on
aggregate incarceration levels).
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definition, and then fleshes out that concept with a series of examples from the policing,
bail, and post-conviction (parole and probation) contexts. Where salient, I offer capsule
accounts of relevant technologies central to my analysis.
A.

A Definition of Algorithmic Criminal Justice

Algorithmic criminal justice, as I define the term, is the application of an automated
protocol to a large volume of data to classify new subjects in terms of the probability of
expected criminal activity, in relation to the application of state coercion. This definition
has three elements. Once explicated, those elements provide a justification for treating this
domain as a distinct object of legal and normative inquiry.
First, my definition requires an automated protocol, or algorithm, that routinizes a
decision, here about state coercion. 58 In contrast to such a structured decision-making
context, American criminal justice is replete with instances in which officials such as police
officers, sentencing judges, parole boards or probation officers exercise partially structured
discretion to determine the legality of coercing a particular person. Even where a written
protocol is used, as in the sentencing context, substantial residual discretion remains.59 In
a larger domain of cases, though, criminal justice actors act unbounded by either protocol
or clear rules. For example, the Fourth Amendment imposes thresholds of “reasonable
articulable suspicion” for certain street stops,60 and “probable cause” for certain arrests.61
The Supreme Court has resisted efforts to formalize these concepts into “technical”62 rules,
and instead has preferred “practical, common-sense judgment.” 63 Algorithmic criminal
justice represents a categorical rejection of such ad hoc, situated judgments as an
instrument of regulation.
Second, automation is required because of the sheer volume of data used by these
tools. Law enforcement agencies increasingly have access to pools of data that are “vast,
fast, disparate, and digital.”64 Colloquially, the instruments at issue here rely on “big data”
as that term is used in computational science.65 In a two-year field study of the Los Angeles
58

THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 10 (2d ed. 2001) (defining an algorithm as
“any well-defined computation process that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces some
value, or set of values, as outcome” (emphases omitted)); see also Reuben Binns, Algorithmic
Accountability and Public Reason, PHIL & TECH. 1, 3 (2017) (describing algorithms in terms of whether a
system will “take certain inputs and produce certain outputs by computational processes”); MARTIN ERWIG,
ONCE UPON AN ALGORITHM: HOW STORIES EXPLAIN COMPUTING 26-27 (2017) (offering an illuminating
conceptual account of algorithms).
59
For an analysis of the scope of discretion in the federal context at present, see Kevin R. Reitz, “Risk
Discretion” at Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT. REP. 68, 68-69 (2017).
60
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
61
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
62
Id. at 175.
63
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983). The Court has stressed police expertise rather than formal
rules. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes
deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person.”).
64
Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 980 (2017).
65
DAWN E. HOLMES, BIG DATA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 15-16 (2017) (characterizing big data as
“huge amounts of data that has not been collected with any specific questions in mind and is often
unsorted,” and that is characterized by “volume, variety, and velocity”).
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Police Department (“LAPD”), for example, sociologist Sarah Brayne documented how
traditional law enforcement databases of persons arrested or convicted of crimes have been
supplemented with information about all contacts, of any sort, with police, social services,
health services, and child welfare services.66 This data is integrated with data from “dragnet
surveillance tools”; close-circuit television (“CCTV”) cameras used to acquire and track
license plate numbers; and “privately collected data.”67 Because the ensuing massive data
pools cannot be sorted by hand, they are only useful because of advances in processing
power and computational software. The IC Realtime Company, for example, offers an
application called “Ella,” which can recognize and execute natural language queries for
CCTV footage.68 Such changes in the speed and accuracy of queries effect a step change
in the quality of surveillance-based evidence available to police.
Third, the algorithmic instruments at issue here make out-of-sample predictions
about new actors’ likely criminal conduct. It is true that algorithmic instruments can be
applied also to extant pools of big data in order to identify historical crimes. For example,
the Securities and Exchange Commission analyzes large volumes of trading to identify
investors who might be engaged in insider trading.69 Pattern analysis of this kind can raise
questions of racial effects, but in distinct and different ways from out-of-sample prediction
methods. The instruments I’m focused on here are generally calibrated using one pool of
data, and then applied to new data as a means for identifying or predicting crime that was
previously unknown, and that typically has not yet occurred. For example a parole board
might have information on historical patterns of reoffending. It supplies that data to a
machine leaning tool, which in turn generates a test for forecasting recidivism by suspects
yet to interact with the criminal justice system.70
So defined, algorithmic criminal justice tools are inductive rather than deductive.
They lack opportunities for verification via the collation of other indicia of law-breaking.
Algorithmic criminal justice, moreover, claims no insight into the causes of crime or
criminality.71 It is just an arrow pointing at crime’s likely next incidence.
B.

The Operation of Algorithmic Criminal Justice

We have already seen two instances of algorithmic criminal justice, the Compas
algorithm and the SSL list. These examples, though, do not provide a good measure of the
scope and effects of algorithmic criminal justice’s operation. New technologies of machine
learning (and in particular the subspecies of deep learning) are likely to dominate
algorithmic criminal justice in the future. As a result, both Compas and the SSL algorithm
66

Brayne, supra note 64, at 995.
Id. at 993-94.
68
James Vincent, Artificial Intelligence is Going to Supercharge Surveillance, THE VERGE, Jan, 23, 2018.
69
Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Keynote Address at the 41st Annual Securities Regulation Institute, Jan. 27,
2014, http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540677500 [https://perma.cc/M7YV-33PR]
(describing the SEC's NEAT program, which can identify and analyze insider trading activity around times
of major corporate events).
70
Richard Berk, An impact assessment of machine learning risk forecasts on parole board decisions and
recividism, 13 J. EXP. CRIM. 193. 195 (2017).
71
Cf. Usama Fayyad, The Digital Physics of Data Mining, 44 COMM. ACM, Mar. 2001, at 62.
67
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are likely soon to be relics. Newer tools will combine powerful computational instruments
with large volumes of data to enable prediction of a kind that is qualitatively distinct from
historical antecedents.72 A survey of the potential uses of these new instruments reveals a
fuller sense of the scope and effects that algorithmic prediction tools will have on criminal
justice.
1.

Machine Learning and Deep Learning

A machine-learning algorithm solves a “learning problem ... of improving some
measure of performance when executing some task through some type of training
experience.”73 The basic task a supervised machine-learning algorithm must perform can
be framed as follows: The algorithm is prompted to define a function f(x) which produces
an output y for any given input x. In other words, it classifies x in terms of y.74 Its outputs
take the form of a sorting of x onto categories of y,75 although the resulting classifications
are correlational rather than causal in nature. 76 Finally, its performance is measured in
terms of how well it captures the relation of x to y.77
To begin with, a supervised machine-learning algorithm is assigned a set of
“training” data already labeled in terms of y so it can develop a model, represented by the
mathematical function f(x), that best represents the relationship between features of each
observation in the training data and the known classification y. This function f(x) is then
applied to a new “test set” of data. 78 The algorithm predicts how to classify this new data
by applying f(x) to generate predictions of y.79 Such supervised tools are but one kind of
machine learning. There is also a species of unsupervised machine-learning algorithm.
These begin with unlabeled training data, and tend to be tasked with the development of
classifications based on the data’s immanent structure.80
72

See JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 39 (2016) (pointing
to “improvements in computer speed and memory, the transition from physically stored data to
electronically stored data, easier access (mainly due to the Internet), and low-cost high-resolution digital
sensors” as the technological predicates of machine learning).
73
Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 33, at 255.
74
Id. This process can also be described in terms of a “classifier” rather than a function, that examines
inputs with “feature values” and outputs a class variable. Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know
About Machine Learning, COMM. ACM, Oct. 2012, at 78-80 (“A classifier is a system that inputs
(typically) a vector of discrete and/or continuous feature values and outputs a single discrete value, the
class.”).
75
PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA
14 (2012) (noting that “multi-class classification” is “a machine learning task in its own right”).
76
Consider in this regard recommendation algorithms employed by consumer-facing companies such as
Amazon and Netflix. Cf. KAPLAN, supra note 72, at 32 (arguing that machine learning algorithms operate
like “incredibly skilled mimics, finding correlations and responding to novel inputs as if to say, ‘This
reminds me of ....’”).
77
Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 33, at 255-57 (noting that performance can be defined in terms of
accuracy, with false positive and false negative rates being assigned a variety of weights).
78
HOLMES, supra note 65, at 24 (discussing classification and distinguishing training and test sets of data);
ALPAYDIN, supra note 31, at 40 (describing the use of training and validation data).
79
STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 693 (3d ed.
2010).
80
FLACH, supra note 75, at 14-15.
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No machine-learning algorithm is given ex ante a functional form f(x) that defines
the relationship between observations and classifications. Rather, the algorithm employs
one of a wide number of procedures to ascertain f(x) through a process called “feature
selection.”81 The latter include decision trees, decision forests, logistic regression, support
vector machines, neutral networks, kernel machines, and Baysian classifiers.82 By sorting
though many different possible f(x)s on the basis of its training data using one of these
methods, the algorithm homes in upon an f(x) that optimizes the accuracy of its
performance metric. Many people experience this in the ‘learning’ they experience on the
part of Siri, Alexa, or other ‘assistants.’83
Deep learning is a subset of machine learning whereby the algorithm is made up of
“multiple layers of representation,” each of which transform the raw data into a slightly
more abstract form.84 Given enough layers of transformation, the algorithm can perform
very complex functions, such as playing the Chinese game Go or recognizing specific
images from representational input. What distinguishes deep learning is the fact that its
“layers of features are not designed by human engineers: they are learned from data using
a general-purpose learning procedure.” 85 The most well-known forms of deep learning
tools are based on “neural networks,” inspired by patterns observed in human brain.86
Deep-learning instruments are especially apt for unsupervised tasks, with no specification
of features, and little “manual interference,” such that designers “just wait and let the
learning algorithm discover all that is necessary by itself.”87 The utility to police of an
instrument that can extract speech or visual patterns from large quantities of audio-visual
inputs (e.g., CCTV footage, cellphone call content) is self-evident.88

81

Kroll et al., supra note 38, at 681 (describing feature selection as concerning the “choices about which
data models should consider”); see also David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 700 (2017) (describing
feature selection); Avrim L. Blum, & Pat Langley, Selection of relevant features and examples in machine
learning, 97 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 245, 250-53 (1997) (decomposing feature selection into a nested
sequence of analytic tasks).
82
David J. Hand, Classifier Technology and the Illusion of Progress, 21 STAT. SCI. 1, 1, 4 (2006)
(documenting these instruments, and contending that in “real world” conditions, simpler instruments often
perform better).
83
“9 Applications of Machine Learning From Day-to-Day Life,” MEDIUM, July 30, 2017,
https://medium.com/app-affairs/9-applications-of-machine-learning-from-day-to-day-life-112a47a429d0/.
84
Le Cuan et al., supra note 34, at 436; id. at 438 (“A deep learning architecture is a multilayer stack of
simple modules, all (or most) of which are subject to learning, and many of which compute non-linear
input-output mappings.”); ALPAYDIN, supra note 31, at 85-109 (describing neural networks). For a nontechnical account of back propagation, the key element of deep learning, see James Somers, Is AI Riding a
One –Trick Pony?, 120(8) MIT TECH. REV. 29, 31 (2017).
85
Le Cuan et al., supra note 34, at 436.
86
Jurgen Schmidhuber, Deep learning in neural networks: An overview, 61 NEURAL NETWORKS 85, 86-87
(2015).
87
ALPAYDIN, supra note 31, at 107-08.
88
Maryam M. Najafabadi, et al., Deep learning applications and challenges in big data analytics, 1 J. BIG
DATA 1, 11-14 (2015) (describing uses of deep learning tools). Deep learning has also been used to play
“games of perfect information” such as chess and Go. David Silver et al., Mastering the game of Go with
deep neural networks and tree search, 529 NATURE 484, 490 (2016).
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2.

The Impact of Machine Learning on Criminal Justice

Adoption of machine learning within the criminal justice system changes the scale,
reach, and operation of state power. Consider each factor in turn.
First, these tools dramatically inflate the state’s ability to acquire otherwise
inaccessible information.89 For instance, police in London and in South Wales now track
individuals’ locations and movements over days and weeks by applying machine learning
tools to thousands of hours of CCTV footage. 90 Machine-learning tools also facilitate
predictions that would be far more imprecise if based solely upon more familiar regression
analyses. 91
Second, machine learning instruments sever the connection between the human
operator and the function f(x) used to solve the classification problem. Unstructured human
discretion, which once infused the criminal justice system, is displaced by an
algorithmically structured logic that is not the function of any human hand. As a result, it
will often not be possible to speak of the ‘intent’ or the ‘anticipated’ consequences of a
classification protocol. Rather, the algorithm will “sift through vast numbers of variables,
looking for combinations that reliably predict outcomes,” handling “enormous numbers of
predictors—sometimes, remarkably, more predictors than observations—combining them
in nonlinear and highly interactive ways,” 92 and hence generating utterly unexpected
outcomes.
To the extent that the design of a machine learning process involves the intentional
crafting and selection of training data, feature sets, or the like, moreover, there will often
be no way to ascertain the role of designers’ racial sentiments (if any) directly,93 and no
easy way to infer intentionality indirectly from the instrument’s results.94 There is no such
thing as code that bespeaks racial animus. Design choices that might be molded by racial
animus also cannot be reverse engineered to cast light on background human motivations.
And it is difficult to know how to disentangle the effect of background differences in
criminality and bad designer intent when evaluating the outputs of an algorithm. As a

89

For recognition of this general point, see United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Posner, J.,) (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance that in
earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive,” thereby “giving the police access to surveillance
techniques that are ever less expensive and ever more effective.”).
90
David Bond, CCTV watchdog warns UK police over use of facial recognition, FIN. TIMES, Oct, 29, 2017,
https://www.ft.com/content/ab60f9f2-bb26-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589.
91
Jon Kleinberg et al., Prediction policy problems, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 491, 493-94 (2015).
92
Ziad Obermeyer, & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Predicting the future—big data, machine learning, and clinical
medicine, 13 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1216, 1217 (2016).
93
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 50, at 710 (“The idea that the representation of different social groups can
be brought into proportions that better match those in the real world presumes that analysts have some
independent mechanism for determining these proportions.”).
94
Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1519-20 (noting how predictions can
be generated in processes “which [are] not explainable in human language,” such that “[i]t would be
difficult for the government to provide a detailed response when asked why an individual was singled out
to receive differentiated treatment by an automated recommendation system”).
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result, the effects of, and evidence for, human intentions—a central term of legal and
constitutional analysis—are likely to be elusive in practice.
Third, algorithmic tools can be as sticky or stickier than the forms of human
discretion. Hence, whereas it is always a possibility that human agents will observe the
unintended effects of human action, machine decision-making can be opaque and hence
resistant to change. Algorithmic systems can thus be “stuck in time until engineers dive in
to change them.”95 Indeed, it will often not be clear to a human operator that an algorithmic
criminal justice tool needs reconsideration. That human operator necessarily sees only a
limited and unrepresentative tranche of case outcomes. She must also grapple with the
sheer technological complexity of algorithmic tools. Hence, algorithmic errors are often
liable to prove more durable than human errors.
Fourth, the consequences of switching between unstructured human discretion and
algorithmically structured prediction can often be unexpected. This happens even when a
semi-structured instrument is altered. For example, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision eliminating the mandatory character of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, studies
found “significantly increased racial disparities after controlling for extensive offender and
crime characteristics.”96
Fifth, the emerging crop of algorithmic tools are potentially very different from risk
assessment tools employed currently in bail and sentencing. Current instruments rely on a
relatively small number of variables—two leading models use 16 and 20 parameters
respectively—and fixed classification rules to generate recidivism risks. 97 These
instruments focus solely on recividism risk. They make no effort to estimate either the
direct or the remote costs of coercive action. In contrast, tools such as Compas include
recommended cut-off points that at least imply an evaluation of social costs. There is no
reason, moreover, that an algorithm could not be trained with data that reflected both the
costs and the benefits of coercive action, although this does not yet appear to be standard
practice.
To summarize, the operation and the effects of predictions offered by algorithmic
criminal justice are qualitatively distinct from the unstructured and semi-structured forms
of human discretion that have until now dominated the criminal justice system. Not all such
tools use machine learning or deep learning. But it is only a question of time before these
powerful instruments crowd out more simple models. Indeed, it is striking that both the
Compas algorithm and the SSL instrument described in the introduction have been
criticized on the basis of their weak predictive power: 98 A likely, if not inevitable,
95

O’NEILL, supra note 51, at 204.
Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. 75, 77 (2015); accord Max Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J. L & ECON. & ORG. 23
(2007) (similar finding).
97
Slobogin, supra note 46, at 584-85 (explaining the OxRec and VRAG assessment tools); see also Lauryn
P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 869-70 (2016)
(describing the PSA tool).
98
On the Compas algorithm: Julia Dressel and Hany Farid, The accuracy, fairness, and limits of predicting
recidivism, SCIENCE ADVANCES, Jan. 17, 2018, http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/1/eaao5580
96
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consequence of such critiques is the adoption of new, more powerful computational tools
to achieve the same end. In any event, a phase shift in the quality of criminal-justice action
can already be observed across the spectrum of criminal justice functionalities. Even if
machine-learning and deep-learning tools are not now omnipresent, they are likely to be so
soon.99
C.

Algorithmic Criminal Justice on the Ground

Algorithmic tools are used now in three main criminal-justice contexts: policing,
bail decisions, and post-conviction matters. This section provides a capsule summary of
the ways in which predictive instruments are operationalized across those three distinct
domains.
1

Policing

In the policing context, algorithmic tools are employed to make predictions about
both places and people. 100 Place-focused tools aggregate “real-time” information on the
frequency and geographic location of crimes to “determine staffing needs or allocate
resources” as between different regions.101 Consonant with a focus on the location of crime,
police departments across the country have increasingly adopted the Compstat, or Crime
Control Strategy Meeting, structure first developed in New York. Under Compstat,
precinct commanders are subject to biweekly questioning by senior departmental
leadership in a “data-saturated environment” about how they are responding to crime
trends. 102 While Compstat itself does not necessarily incorporate algorithmic tools, its
focus on data-driven predictions of crime’s geographic dispersion invites the use of
algorithmic tools. Further, a number of criminologists have identified promise in a placebased prediction approach involving the “the application of police interventions at very
(finding that the Compas algorithm performs no better than people with no experience of the criminal
justice system in making recidivism predictions). On the SSL: Jessica Saunders et al., Predictions put into
practice: A quasi-experimental evaluation of Chicago’s predictive policing pilot, 12 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY
347, 363 (2016) (finding that “while using arrestee social networks improved the identification of future
homicide victims, the number was still too low in the pilot to make a meaningful impact on crime).
99
One reason for this, of course, is the promotion of algorithmic implements by the companies that
manufacture them, and stand to gain financially from their adoption. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence
of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 114-120 (2017) (describing
mechanisms of private influence on public adoption of computational technologies in the criminal justice
sector).
100
For overviews, see Walter L. Perry et al,, Rand Corp, Predictive Policing: Forecasting Crime for Law
Enforcement 2 (2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9735.html; see also Jennifer Bachner,
Predictive Policing: Preventing Crime with Data and Analytics 14 (2013), available at http://
www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Predictive%20Policing.pdf (“The fundamental notion
underlying the theory and practice of predictive policing is that we can make probabilistic inferences about
future criminal activity based on existing data.”).
101
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime
Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 182 (2011).
102
James J. Willis et al., Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational
Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 147, 147 (2007); see also David L. Carter &
Jeremy G. Carter, Intelligence-Led Policing: Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy,
20 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 310, 316-19 (2009) (describing Compstat’s operation).
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small geographic units of analysis,” or hot spots.103 A number of randomized, controlled
experiences have found evidence that such place-focused tools are effective in suppressing
crime.104
Consistent with these developments, influential jurisdictions have adopted
machine-learning tools to facilitate place-based policing.105 One of the earliest adaptors,
starting in 2015, was the New York Police Department. This force embarked on a two-year
pilot program using HunchLab, an algorithm developed by the Philadelphia-based Azavea
company.106 According to Azavea’s web site, HunchLab’s “ensemble machine learning”
algorithm uses “temporal patterns (day of week, seasonality); weather; risk terrain
modeling (locations of bars, bus stops, etc.); socioeconomic indicators; historic crime
levels; and near repeat patterns” as a means of “predicting individual crime expectations
across the jurisdiction.”107 Other departments, such as Los Angeles, have adopted a system
created by the PredPol company. PredPol produces a propriety algorithm based on a “nearrepeat” machine-learning model. This assumes that if a crime occurs at a given location,
the immediate surroundings are at increased risk for future crime.108 The PredPol model is
an extrapolation first developed by anthropologist Jeffrey Brantingham and mathematician
Andrea Bertozzi, of an algorithm used to predict the distribution of earthquake shocks.109
One randomized, controlled study of the use of a machine-learning tool derived from
models of epidemic aftershocks to implement hot-spot policing found that the instrument
predicted crime well, and led to a 7.4 percent reduction in crime volume as a function of
patrol time.110
In the last five years, however, place-focused tools have started to be supplemented
with person-focused tools. Chicago, for example, started to build a database of alleged gang
103

ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES 9 (2010). More generally,
proactive policing of various kinds (not necessarily involving stops) is also associated with crime-control
effects. Charis E. Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48 CRIMINOLOGY
57, 62 (2010).
104
See Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577 (2008); Anthony Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in
Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Control Experiment, 37 Criminology 541 (1999).
105
See, e.g., J. Brian Charles, How Police are Using Tech to Fight Crime, GOVERNING, Apr. 11, 2018,
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-gang-violence-predictive-policing-high-pointlc.html?r (describing the use of ONESolution predictive software by the High Point, NC, police
department).
106
Laura Nahmias and Miranda Newbauer, NYPD testing crime forecast software, POLITICO, July 8, 2015,
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2015/07/nypd-testing-crime-forecast-software090820.
107
Hunchlab, Hunchlab under the Hood 12 (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/hunchlab/HunchLabUnder-the-Hood.pdf.
108
Brayne, supra note 64, at 989; see generally PredPol, How Predictive Policing Works, PREPPOL.COM
(2015), http://www.predpol.com/how-predictive-policing-works (providing a predictably rosy overview of
the algorithm’s uses).
109
Aaron Shapiro, Reform Predictive Policing, 541 NATURE 458, 459 (2017); see also Elizabeth E. Joh,
Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 44 (2014) (describing
PredPol’s use in Santa Cruz, California).
110
George O. Mohler et al., Randomized controlled field trials of predictive policing, 110 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N 1399, 1407 (2015).
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members in order to draw inferences about their propensity to commit violent crimes.111
That city’s SSL predicts the likelihood of an individual becoming a victim of a homicide
using an analysis of that person’s known social network, and in particular by counting the
number of first degree co-arrest links and the number of second-degree co-arrest links with
previous homicide victims.112 Names generated by the SSL algorithm were disseminated
to district commanders, who had discretion about what interventions to apply. 113 The
algorithm, however, identified only one percent of the pool of eventual homicide victims,
and yielded no identifiable crime-control gains.114
A related use of deep-learning tools involves facial recognition algorithms that can
search for dangerous persons in a specific place at a particular time. This emerging use is
not a matter of out-of-sample prediction. It is a matching exercise based on new data, and
so falls at the periphery of my analysis. For instance, the Metropolitan Police of London
combine dense CCTV with facial recognition instruments in monitoring public events that
are thought to be attractive targets for terrorist attacks.115 In June 2017, the deployment of
facial recognition algorithms to real-time CCTV inputs generated a first arrest for British
police.116
The situation in the United States is less clear. As of 2016, at least five metropolitan
police departments in the United States—including Chicago’s, Dallas’s, and Los
Angeles’—claimed to use a facial recognition algorithm to comb public CCTV data.117
Facial images have been made available by the Federal Bureau of Investigation since
2011.118 In 2017, Orlando, FL, and Washington County, OR, became some of the first
governmental purchasers of Amazon’s “Rekognition” tool, which uses “artificial
intelligence” to scan and identify up to a hundred faces in a single CCTV shot. 119
111

John Buntin, Social Media Transforms the Way Chicago Fights Gang Violence, GOVERNING, Oct. 2013,
at 26, 28 (describing how data was acquired for social media analysis).
112
Saunders et al., supra note 98, at 354.
113
Id.; see also Mark Guarnio, Can Math Stop Murder?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 20, 2014), http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-stop-murder-video, archived at http:// perma.cc/G3TA9SPT (discussing predictive policing techniques in Chicago including sending officers to the houses of
suspected gang leaders).
114
Saunders et al., supra note 98, at 363; id. at 365 (noting that those included on the SSL list were in fact
less likely to be a victim of a shooting, although that difference was not statistically significant).
115
Mark Townsend, Police to Use Facial Recognition Cameras at Cenotaph Service, THE GUARDIAN, Nov.
12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/12/metropolitan-police-to-use-facialrecognition-technology-remembrance-sunday-cenotaph.
116
Cara McGoogan, British police arrest suspect spotted with facial recognition technology, TELEGRAPH,
June 7, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/06/07/british-police-arrest-suspect-spottedfacial-recognition-technology/.
117
Claire Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Face Recognition in America, Oct. 16, 2016,
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/.
118
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-16-267, Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better
Ensure Privacy and Accuracy 7, 15 (May 2016)
119
Matt Cagle & Nicole Ozer, Amazon Teams Up With Government to Deploy Dangerous New Facial
Recognition Technology, ACLU, May 18, 2018, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/amazon-teams-government-deploy-dangerousnew?redirect=blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazon-teams-law-enforcement-deploydangerous-new.
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Nevertheless, real-time application of facial recognition technologies to CCTV data still
appears rare, in particular because of technological barriers. It is telling that between June
and September 2017, the National Institute for Science and Technology ran a prize
challenge for facial recognition technology. The winner of the context, NTechLab, created
an algorithm with a rate of 0.22 false non-matches for every 0.0001 false match.120 And,
as noted above, in 2018, the IC Realtime company introduced a commercially available
algorithm called Ella that can recognize and respond to natural language queries to search
large quantities of video footage for specific images.121
2.

Bail

The second use of algorithmic tools is in the pre-trial context of arraignment
hearings in which judges determine whether defendants are to be detained pending criminal
trial, or released having posted a money bail or otherwise. Pretrial detainees comprise
roughly 60 percent of the jail population, and between 2005 and 2013 some 450,000 people
were incarcerated awaiting trial on any given day.122 Pre-trial detention decisions impose
considerable costs on individuals, in relation to employment, health outcomes, and
childcare costs. 123 One study, for example, estimates a lower-bound net cost of detention
for the marginal individual of $55,385 and an upper-bound net cost of $101,223.124 At the
same time, “[r]elatively little is known about the charge characteristics and case
dispositions” for that pretrial detention population.125 But studies in a range of jurisdictions
find evidence of racial disparities in bail decisions; predictably, black and Latino
defendants receive systematically less favorable treatment.126
Much of the impetus of recent bail reform has hinged on the much-criticized effect
of wealth upon access to pretrial release. 127 Algorithmic criminal justice does not
120

Patrick Grother et al., The 2017 IARPA Face Recognition Prize Challenge (FRCP, Nov. 2017, at 2,
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8197.pdf.
121
James Vincent, Artificial Intelligence is Going to Supercharge Surveillance, THE VERGE, Jan. 23, 2018,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/23/16907238/artificial-intelligence-surveillance-cameras-security.
122
Jaeok Kim et al., Unpacking pretrial detention: An examination of patterns and predictors of
readmissions, 29 CRIM. J. POL. REV. 663, 664 (2018); Roy Walmsley, Int'l Ctr. for Prison Studies, World
Pre-trial/Remand Imprisonment List 1 (2d ed. 2014),
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_pretrial_imprisonment_list_2nd_edition_1.pdf.
123
For a discussion of the costs of pretrial bail, see Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE
L.J. 490, 547 (2018).
124
Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1436 (2017).
125
Kim, supra note 122, at 667.
126
Yang, supra note 124, 1466–67 (finding “compelling evidence that bail judges in these jurisdictions
treat defendants of different races differently in setting bail”); Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic
Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 JUST. Q. 170, 187 (2005) (same result for hold rates within a
county using the nationally representative State Court Processing Statistics); accord Stephen Demuth &
Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in the Pretrial Release Process, 51 Soc.
Probs. 222, 222 (2004);. But see Frank McIntyre & Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Pretrial
Detention, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 741, 769 (2013) (rejecting any finding of racial disparities after
having controlled for the probability of re-arrest).
127
Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=1.
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necessarily respond to this problem, except to the extent it enables a reduction of pretrial
detention without imposing any cost on crime-related outcomes.128 Rather, such tools are
an obvious fit in a context where magistrates are forced to make predictive decisions about
the risk of violence, criminality, or flight on the basis of relatively cursory information.
Already, two simple algorithms, the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) and Canadian Level
of Service Inventory Revised (LSI-R) use information from criminal history to personality
patterns and age to offer recidivism predictions. 129 The latter instrument, however, is
administered by professionals through interviews, and involves no computational
element.130 More sophisticated algorithmic instruments are now starting to be introduced
into courtrooms to inform bond determinations in jurisdictions across the country.131
Numerous jurisdictions give judges access to the Compas system in the pre-trial
arraignment context.132 But there is a surprising paucity of public information about the
manner of its implementation, or its effects on the rates of pretrial release or the
composition of the pretrial detainee population. Two studies, one conducted in Philadelphia
and the other in an unnamed large American city, compared the performance of different
machine-learning algorithms with that of the existing bench. Both find that the
computational method generated less mis-ranking of criminal defendants and less crime.133
These studies, however, focus narrowly on the important question of gains to public safety
that would result from a move from human to machine prediction. They appear to assume
that jurisdictions will respond to algorithmic criminal justice instruments by using less
pretrial incarceration to obtain the same levels of deterrence. It is not clear, though, why
this assumption is warranted. Most (but not all) of the studies are silent as to the possibility
or magnitude of racial effects, a striking omission given the large empirical literature
documenting racial disparities in bail decisions.134
128

As New Orleans has. Aviva Sen and CityLab, New Orleans’ Great Bail Reform Experiment, THE
ATLANTIC, Oct 19, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/new-orleans-great-bailreform-experiment/544964/ (finding that both the pretrial detention and the pretrial crime rate had fallen
using the tool).
129
EPIC, Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/.
130
Alexander M. Holsinger, Implementation of actuarial risk/need assessment and its effect on community
supervision revocations, 15 J. RES. & POL. 95, 98-99 (2013).
131
Ellora Thadaney Israni, When an Algorithm Helps Send You to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/opinion/algorithm-compas-sentencing-bias.html; see also Richard
Berk & Jonathan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Discretion, 27 FED.
SENT. 222, 223 (2015) (explaining advantages of machine-learning tools over the LSI-R); Richard F.
Lowden, Risk Assessment Algorithms: The Answer to an Inequitable Bail System, 19 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
221, 230 (2018) (listing jurisdictions that have adopted algorithmic tools).
132
Angwin et al., supra note 15. It is not wholly clear how much weight judges give to the Compas scores,
or whether there is even a uniform practice.
133
Jon Kleinberg et al., Human decisions and machine predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON, 237, 237-38 (2017)
[hereinafter “Kleinberg et al., Human decision”] (finding that large decreases in offending rates could be
achieved by moving from judicial to machine predictions in the bail context for violent crimes); Richard A.
Berk, Susan B. Sorenson, and Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting domestic violence: A machine learning
approach to help inform arraignment decisions, 13 J. EMP. L. STUD. 94, 110 (2016) (finding that the release
rate of 20 percent repeat offenders in a pool of domestic violent defendants could be dropped to a 10
percent rate through a move from judicial to machine-led determinations).
134
See sources cited in supra note 126. One study to address potential racial effects is Kleinberg et al.,
Human decision, supra note 133, at 237.
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3.

Sentencing

A recent survey of state sentencing practice comments that it is “improbable” that
any convicted felon, whether an adult or juvenile, would be sentenced today without the
aid of some sort of actuarial risk instrument, albeit not necessarily one that employs
algorithmic means. 135 In some jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, New Hampshire,
Arkansas, and Vermont, state law even affirmatively mandates the use of predictive
instruments in the sentencing phrase.136 Such instruments have emerged as part of a “fullon embrace of practices that promise to reduce the risk of reoffending by convicted
persons.”137
In 2015, more than 60 risk-assessment tools were used in sentencing contexts.138
These risk assessments typically evaluated where within a statutorily calibrated sentencing
range an offender’s sentence should lie accounting for “utilitarian crime-control
grounds.” 139 Some jurisdictions, such as Virginia, use a noncomputational “actuarial”
instrument calibrated by age, felony record, offense type, employment, and gender, to sort
nonviolent, low-risk offenders to alternative punishments such as probation, jail time, and
restitution.140 In other jurisdictions, computational instruments such as Compas are used
for that same purpose.141 Such instruments are only recently attracting judicial attention,
including a high-profile constitutional challenge to Wisconsin’s algorithm.142
Finally, I have been able to locate only one well-detailed example of a machinelearning algorithm being employed in the parole context. In 2010, the Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole started developing a machine-learning protocol using random
135

Zachary Hamilton et al., Designed to fit: The development and validation of the STRONG-R recidivism
risk assessment, 43 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 230, 231 (2016).
136
42 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 2154.7 (2009) (mandating the creation of a “risk assessment instrument” for
determining “the relative risk that an offender will reoffend and be a threat to public safety”); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-93-615 (a)(1)(B) (2015) (“The determination... shall be made by reviewing information such as
the result of the risk-needs assessment to inform the decision of whether to release a person on parole by
quantifying that person's risk to reoffend, and if parole is granted, this information shall be used to set
conditions for supervision.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504-A:15(I) (2011) (requiring that “[e]very person
placed on probation or parole... be assessed by the department of corrections, using a valid and objective
risk assessment tool, to determine that person’s risk of recidivating” and that the results be used to
determine the length of active supervision); Vt. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554c(a)(1) (2015) (“The objective of
a pretrial risk assessment is to provide information to the Court for the purpose of determining whether a
person presents a risk of nonappearance or a threat to public safety so the Court can make an appropriate
order concerning bail and conditions of pretrial release.”).
137
Klingele, supra note 57, at 551-52.
138
Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., Should Prison Sentences Be Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been
Committed Yet?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT POLITICS, Aug. 4, 2015, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/prisonreform-risk-assessment/.
139
John Monahan & Jennifer Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLIN.
PSYCHOL. 489, 493-94 (2016).
140
Id. at 495.
141
Angwin et al., supra note 15.
142
State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761-62 (2016) (upholding the use of the Compas tool in sentencing in
Wisconsin); see infra text accompanying notes 166 to 167 (discussing Loomis).
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forests to generate forecasts of recidivism to assist members of the Board in making
discrete parole decisions.143 When subject to performance evaluation seven years later, the
algorithm was found to have reduced re-arrests for both non-violent and violent crime.144
D.

The Emerging Evidence of Race Effects

The interaction of criminal justice and race looms large in legal scholarship.145 To
date, however, consideration of the racial effects (if any) of algorithmic criminal justice
has been piecemeal. This section briefly surveys existing studies of algorithmic criminal
system systems that touch on questions of race. This survey suggests there are real reasons
for closely analyzing the various effect of algorithmic tools on criminal justice. It also
suggests that there is more than one pathway by which racial effects can emerge. Any
analytic framework for capturing race effects in this context must therefore also be plural.
1.

Policing and the Problem of Tainted Training Data

In the policing context, some commentators have flagged the possibility that the
use of algorithmic instruments will reinforce existing race-based patterns of policing.146
This may occur because algorithmic predictions will vary depending on the quality of the
training data used to construct the predictive function. For example, if the training data
systematically omits data about certain subsets of a population—if it has what Kate
Crawford calls “black holes” 147 —it will generate results that fail to account for some
population. Such gaps can be a function of poor relations between law enforcement and
certain communities. For example, imagine a jurisdiction that allocates patrol resources
based on historical reports of crime. Neighborhoods characterized by poor relations with
police might underreport crime, such that they receive fewer policing resources in the
future. But, contra Crawford, algorithmic tools might also be used to compensate for
asymmetrical data gaps. Hence, the Shotspotter system records shots fired in urban
environments. It can thus reveal neighborhoods in which residents do not report shootings
to police. 148 This has at least the potential to mitigate historical enforcement gaps. To
143

Richard Berk, An impact assessment of machine learning risk forecasts on parole board decisions and
recidivism, 13 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 193, 195 (2017) [hereinafter “Berk, Impact assessment”]. For a clear
and nontechnical explanation of random forests methods, see Richard Cutler, D. et al., Random forests for
classification in ecology, 88 ECOLOGY 2783, 2884-85 (2007).
144
Berk, Impact Assessment, supra note 143, at 212.
145
See sources cited in supra notes 11 and 9.
146
Brayne, supra note 64, at 997 (arguing that “data-driven surveillance may be implicated in the
reproduction of inequality ... by deepening the surveillance of individuals already under suspicion; by
widening the criminal justice dragnet unequally; and leading people to avoid ‘surveilling’ institutions that
are fundamental to social integration”).
147
Kate Crawford, The Anxieties of Big Data, NEW INQUIRY, May 30, 2014, https://thenewinquiry.com/theanxieties-of-big-data/.
148
Sarah Griffith, Fighting a Losing Battle, DAILY MAIL U.K., Apr. 19, 2016,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3547719/Fighting-losing-battle-AI-ShotSpotter-computerused-track-gunfire-reveals-far-shots-fired-reported.html. Another example is a predictive tool used by
hospitals to predict readmissions missed patients with asthma from the readmission function because those
patients had been triaged to intensive care units rather than being released in the training data. Rich
Caruana et al., Intelligible models for healthcare: Predicting pneumonia risk and hospital 30-day
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conclude that algorithmic instruments will either necessarily undermine, or necessarily
perpetuate, historical imbalances in the allocation of criminal justice resources seems
premature. They can do both.
Policy distortions might also arise if historical data of political activity, deployed
as training data for an algorithmic tool, is inflected by the racial presumptions and
stereotypes of the past officials. Such measurement effort “will create decision and
allocation bias.”149 The concern here is a variant on a worry common in medical research
that “race is such a dominant category in the cognitive field that the ‘interim solution’ [of
using race as a proxy for some other trait of interest] can leave its own indelible mark.”150
That is, race is such a freighted category that once deployed, it cannot be taken back. Race
effects can arise if data collected as a by-product of police activity does “not pertain to
future instances of crime” but rather to “instances of crime that become known to
police.”151 If police activity is predicted by race, then subsequent policing (and hence the
costs of policing) will be unevenly allocated by race. This can happen even if nonviolent
crime is evenly distributed. The result is greater black exposure to arrest and
incarceration.152 Such distortions are not evitable. It has been demonstrated in the computer
science literature that incorporating an element of randomization into the algorithm is one
way of buffering this kind of distortion.153
How forceful, as an empirical matter, are these concerns? One study of PredPol’s
algorithm suggests that there is reason for concern. According to that study, when the
algorithm used police data to generate predictions of narcotics crimes in Oakland, the
algorithm recommended that twice as much policing resources be directed to black as
opposed to white areas, despite the fact that narcotics offenses were reasonably equally
spread across both white and black areas.154 A second study, once more focused on the
PredPol algorithm, identified the possibility of “runaway feedback loops,” by which police
are repeatedly sent back to the same neighborhood in a way that reinforces with growing
readmission, in 2015 PROC. 21TH ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA
MINING 1721.
149
Stendhal Mullainathan & Ziad Obermeyer, Does Machine Learning Automate Moral Hazard and
Error?, 107 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 476, 478 (2017).
150
Troy Duster, Race and reification in science, 307 SCIENCE 1050,1050 (2005).
151
Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2106, at 14, 16.
152
For findings that race, rather than criminality, predicted deployment in one city (Seattle), see Katherine
Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC.
PROB. 419, 435 (2005); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of
Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROB. 419, 435 (2005); see also Huq, Disparate Policing, supra note
4, at 2929-40 (discussing effects of such disproportionate allocations of policing resources).
153
Kroll et al., supra note 38, at 682-83; Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 195 (2017) (“[W] hen a model produces biased outcomes due to the processes
generating the input values, merely tweaking the distribution of data inputs will not solve the problem.”).
154
Lum & Isaac, supra note 151, at 18, fig. 2. The background estimate of the geographic distribution of
narcotics offenses derives from separate national data. A survey of Los Angeles residents by the advocacy
group Stop LAPD Spying Coalition similarly found police contact highly concentrated in less than 2
percent of the population, and suggested that this flowed from the use of an algorithmically derived
“Chronic Offender Bulletin.” Maha Ahmed, Aided by Palantir, The LAPD Uses Predictive Policing to
Monitor Specific People and Neighborhoods, THE INTERCEPT, May 11, 2018,
https://theintercept.com/2018/05/11/predictive-policing-surveillance-los-angeles/.
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force initial distortions in the training data.155 Third, in a qualitative study of L.A.’s use of
predictive policing, Brayne concludes that PredPol increases surveillance of low-income,
minority residents who are already under surveillance; widened “the surveillance dragnet”
unequal; and drove members of the aforementioned communities “to avoid ‘surveilling’
institutions.”156 These studies suggest that PredPol and similar technologies do distort the
optimal allocation of policing resources in part because the individuals being regulated do
not hew to fixed patterns of behavior. Rather, they respect PredPol-driven interventions.
Moreover, because the individuals regulated by PredPol are heterogeneous in their
responses to policing—some engage in more avoidance behavior than others—the error
rate across the population as a result of such variable responsiveness to new policing
intervention will also be uneven.157
Companies marketing algorithmic criminal justice instruments have evinced
varying levels of concern about this possibility of racial effects. On the one hand, PredPol’s
manufacturer advertises its exclusion of “drug related and traffic offenses from its
predictions to remove officer bias.”158 Similarly, HunchLab underscores its reliance on
non-crime-related data as a way of making predictions not influenced by potentially flawed
past exercises of officer discretion.159 On the other hand, the Sentencing Commission of
Pennsylvania has incorporated arrest data into its sentencing algorithm despite the fact that
there is good reason to think that police discretion as to when and whom to arrest may have
racial distortions.160
Finally, concerns about the polluting effect of historical training data are not limited
to predictive algorithms. Studies of facial recognition technologies also suggest racial
disparities in accuracy rates. One 2012 study tested three commercial algorithms on mug
shots from Pinellas County, Florida. African Americans were between five and ten percent
less likely to be successfully identified—i.e., more likely to be falsely rejected—than other
demographic groups. It identified a similar decline for females as compared to males and
younger subjects as compared to older subjects.161 A measure of caution, though, should
be used in evaluating these studies today. Much has changed in the domain of machine and
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Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway feedback loops in predictive policing,
4-5 (2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09847.
156
Brayne, supra note 64, at 997.
157
For an account of the difference between prediction problems and causal inference problems, and the
risks of confusing the two, see Athey, supra note 32, at 355.
158
Machine Learning and Policing, PREDPOL BLOG, July 19, 2017, http://blog.predpol.com/machinelearning-and-policing.
159
HunchLab, supra note 107, at 12.
160
Barry-Jester et al., supra note 138.
161
Brendan F. Klare et al., Face Recognition Performance: Role of Demographic Information, 7 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1789, 1797 (2012); see also Jonathon Phillips
et al., An Other-Race Effect for Face Recognition Algorithms, 8 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON APPLIED
PERCEPTION 14:1, 14:5 (2011) (finding that other leading algorithms performed worse on African
Americans, women, and young adults than on Caucasians, men, and older people, respectively).
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deep learning since 2012,162 and it cannot be assumed that limitations on computational
instruments that existed then still hinder analogous tools today.
2.

Bail/Sentencing Predictions and the Problem of Distorting Feature Selection

The problems with algorithmic criminal justice do not begin and end with a concern
with tainted historical training data. Attention to the bail and sentencing context suggests
that even when there is no allegation of tainted training data, algorithmic criminal justice
can generate concerns related to racial equity as a consequence of feature selection
decisions. Even if these concerns focus on arguably unanticipated results, they might
nonetheless have empirically consequential magnitudes.
Perhaps the highest profile debate concerning the racial effects of algorithmic
instruments in criminal justice concerns, though, has focused on the Compas algorithm.
Analyzing Compas data from Broward County, Florida, Pro Publica observed that the
algorithm was “likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling
them this way almost twice the rate of white defendants,” and to mislabel white defendants
as “low risk more often than black defendants.”163 That is, conditional on being a non-risky
type, the Compas algorithm is more likely to overstate the risk presented by a black rather
than a white person. Northpointe’s response did not focus on this measure of false positives
(or, correlatively, the measure of false negatives that list in favor of whites). Instead, it
identified the pool of individuals assigned a certain risk score as the relevant pool of
comparators, and showed that within that pool, a white and a black defendant were equally
likely to recidivate.164 The ratio it emphasized, that is, takes as a denominator the group
identified as high risk within each racial group, and then asks how many of those
identifications are erroneous. This is the rate of false positions conditional on being
identified as a risky type. As one group of computer scientists has noted, the resulting
debate might well be understood not in terms of whether the Compas algorithm was racially
discriminated—after all, there was no dispute that the algorithm did not include race as a
feature—but rather what kind of racial effects counted in a normative or legal evaluation
of its performance.165
Compas’s use in criminal sentencing has been challenged on various constitutional
grounds. But its race-related effects remain untested in court. The most extensive judicial
treatment of Compas, offered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Loomis, focused
on a Due Process challenge to the extent to which criminal defendants could challenge the
algorithm’s terms.166 Rejecting a challenge to the way in which the algorithm accounted
162

A particularly vivid illustration of this is the dramatic increase in the quality of machine translation
tools. Gideon Lewis-Krauss, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES, Dec, 14, 2016, at M40,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html.
163
Angwin et al., supra note 15.
164
Dietrich et al., supra note 19, at 3.
165
See Feller et al, supra note 21.
166
State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761-62 (2016) (holding that because the algorithm employed only
publicly available data, or data that a defendant has supplied, the defendant could have denied or explained
any information that was employed to develop his prediction). It is worth noting that the Court’s analysis
here misses the force of the defendant’s argument: The latter seemed objected not so much to the
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for a suspect’s gender, the Wisconsin Court noted in passing “concerns regarding how a
COMPAS assessment’s risk factors correlate with race.”167 Unfortunately, the Court did
not connect that observation with either a legal theory pursuant to which such correlations
might be objectionable, or, alternatively, a normative basis for concern notwithstanding
legality. Otherwise, commentators have noted that actuarial sentencing tools, whether
algorithmic or not, might have more or less disparate racial impact or “inequitable social
consequences.”168 But precisely what these “consequences” might be remains unclear.
Nevertheless, the COMPAS debate suggests that concerns about racial equity can
persist even if the inputs to the algorithm are not tainted by any historical bias. Part of my
aim here, particularly in Part III, is to explain how this can be so. For now, it suffices to
say that earlier commentators who have suggested that algorithmic bias can be addressed
exclusively through “a transparency of inputs and outputs” may have captured only one
part of a larger normative picture.
169

3.

Conclusion: An Incomplete Evidentiary Record

Race interacts with algorithmic criminal justice tools in one of three ways. First,
racial animus or stereotypical thinking can infect and distort training data. Second, race
may be a feature used for classification. Third, the classification rule may have predictable
effects that seem asymmetrical between racial groups. Scholars’ thinking about and
responses to the racial effects of algorithmic criminal justice instruments have been ad hoc
and unsystematic. We have at best fragments of a more systematic account of how such
effects arise and what effects they have. Hence, understanding empirically the manner in
which algorithmic tools redistribute coercive outcomes should remain an important focus
of research. Still, even with limited evidence in hand, it seems there is reason for thinking
about the appropriate normative framework for evaluating these instruments’ racial
effects—especially given the long and troubled interaction between criminal justice policy
and widely held beliefs about racial differences in culture and behavior.
The conceptual tools for that investigation are plainly wanting at the moment. There
is no general agreement on the ways in which racial effects might count against the
adoption or continued use of an algorithm. Insufficient attention, moreover, has been paid
to the difference between tainted training data and problematic feature selection. There is
also no general understanding of what it means to say that feature selection is flawed. Nor
is there any consideration of how different kinds of racial effects might be weighed against
each other. The field is ripe, in short, for more careful theorization of what it precisely
means to talk about racial equity in this context.
nondisclosure of information about his own circumstances, but the manner in which that information was
evaluated and weighted by the Compas algorithm.
167
Id.
168
Monahan & Skeem, supra note 139, at 507. For an empirical study that renders these concepts with
more precision, see Jennifer L. Skeem and Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, race, and recidivism:
predictive bias and disparate impact, 4 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 702-03 (2016) (analyzing the relation of the
Post Conviction Risk Assessment tool and future arrests, and finding that scores tracked the same level of
recidivism within each group).
169
Chander, supra note 42, at 1039.
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II.

Equal Protection and Algorithmic Criminal Justice

But is such theorization needed? The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, after all, purports to provide a general norm regulating the state’s use of race.
Perhaps constitutional equality jurisprudence provides the needful criterion for evaluating
the race effects of algorithm criminal justice.
Or perhaps not. I describe and apply in this Part conventional doctrinal norms
articulated under the Equal Protection Clause. Its core lesson is that the dominant intentand classification-focused calibration is ill suited to the forms and dynamics of algorithmic
criminal justice tools. To be sure, one might choose to apply the litmus tests supplied in
the jurisprudence. But given that these focus on qualities of state action that are irrelevant,
or barely relevant, to the way that algorithms in practice work, it is hard to see why one
would do so. If there is a lesson here, indeed, it is about the woeful inadequacy of our
constitutional equality norms for the contemporary world.
A.

What Equal Protection Protects

Equal Protection doctrine imposes two fundamental prohibitions on governmental
action touching on race.170 One concerns formal racial classifications. The other pertains
to racialized intentions. The Court has either rejected or ignored concerns about the
illegitimate nature or delegitimizing consequences of raw racial disparities in criminal
justice.
Almost since its inception, constitutional Equal Protection has been understood to
prohibit most laws containing an explicit racial classification, as well as laws that assign
rights or burdens based on racial classification.171 The first major judicial interpretation of
the Clause, Strauder v. West Virginia, concerned a state statute limiting jury service to
“white male persons … twenty-one years of age.” 172 Invalidating the conviction of an
African-American man under this provision, the Court explained that the statute’s want of
facial equality violated the Constitution’s “immunity from inequality of legal
protection.”173 Racial classifications today are not per se invalid. Rather, they now trigger
searching judicial review of their tailoring and means-ends rationality, an inquiry known
as “strict scrutiny.”174
170

Concerns about racial equity in criminal law need not be expressed in terms of Equal Protection
jurisprudence. Many cases formally concerning Due Process arose in the context of discriminatory law
enforcement, and are plausibly understood in terms of the Court’s desire to constrain the latter’s discretion.
My concern in this Part is the formal doctrinal specification of equality, not its potential jurisprudential
substitutes.
171
Canonical exceptions include Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
172
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (citation omitted).
173
Id. at 310.
174
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (imposing such
scrutiny whenever “the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications”); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (describing the use of such
classifications as “pernicious” (citation omitted)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235
(1995) (“Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest,
and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”).
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Notoriously, strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal. 175 In Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, for example, the Court upheld the University of Texas at Austin’s
admission program, even though it accounted for race as one element of a “Personal
Achievement Index,” or PAI. 176 This satisfied strict scrutiny because the University
“articulated concrete and precise goals” in relation to educational diversity; relied on “both
statistical and anecdotal evidence” of a need for affirmative action; and engaged in ongoing
deliberation about admissions protocols.177 Precisely how Fisher calibrated strict scrutiny,
though, is difficult to say. Educational diversity is not easily reduced to “concrete and
precise” terms. Nothing the Court said illuminated how it tested the means-ends rationality
behind the University’s actions.178 Yet in other contexts, it has construed strict scrutiny to
work a near-categorical prohibition on similarly race-conscious government action.179 For
instance, in an earlier capital habeas case, the Court made that errant suggestion that race
is “totally irrelevant to the sentencing process.”180 Such evanescent dicta, however, are
probably too frail to support any firm conclusion.
Second, the Equal Protection Clause’s regulation of racial considerations extends
to instances in which the state harms an individual because of “a racially discriminatory
purpose.”181 This requires litigants “show both that the passive enforcement system had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”182 The Court
has not defined with precision what counts as a “racially discriminatory purpose.”183 But
at a minimum, it seems to include naked, taste-based aversion to a group based exclusively
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Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.”’).
176
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). On the construction of the PAI, see Fisher v. University of Texas, 131 S Ct.
2411 S. Ct. 2415, 2415-15 (2013).
177
Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2214-15.
178
David A. Strauss, Fisher v. University of Texas and the Conservative Case for Affirmative Action, 2016
SUP. CT, REV. 1, 16-17 (“The central problem is that judgments about the kind and degree of diversity that
a student body should have ... are simply not susceptible to precise metrics.”).
179
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1337 (2007) (“According to
one interpretation, strict scrutiny embodies a nearly categorical prohibition against infringements of
fundamental rights, regardless of the government's motivation, but subject to rare exceptions when the
government can demonstrate that infringements are necessary to avoid highly serious, even catastrophic
harms.”).
180
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
181
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that “the basic equal protection principle that
the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose”). Racial intent must be the but-for cause of an action. Personnel Admr. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory purpose requires showing that government decisionmaker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite
of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”).
182
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
183
See Huq, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 40, at 21-36 (describing five different theories of
discriminatory purpose in the case law); accord David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and Taming of
Brown, 59 U CHI. L. REV. 935, 947 (1989) (noting that even canonical cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education did not clarify “which conception of discrimination [the Court] embraced, or how far the
principle of [Equal Protection] extended”).

- 32 Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144831
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144831

on race.184 So the Court recently explained that evidence that a juror relied on “racial
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant” would be sufficient to warrant
reversal of that conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds.185 Even here, the doctrine is not
without ambiguity. It is not clear, for instance, whether a state actor shown to have made a
decision based on racial animus could plausibly respond that their action could nonetheless
be upheld because they survived strict scrutiny. Analytically, it is hard to see how a
measure based on an invidious stereotype could ever be closely fitted to a legitimate state
interest. So it may be that the question does not arise because it has little operational
importance.186
And there are other ways that race can infiltrate the mind beyond animus. For
example, a rational reliance on race as a statistically accurate proxy for some other policysalient quality is analytically distinct from taste-based discrimination.187 The Court has not
been clear on whether such statistical discrimination triggers constitutional concerns. On
the one hand, in the 2007 case Johnson v. California, a majority of the Justices held that
strict scrutiny applied to an unwritten California prison policy of racially segregating
prisoners for up to sixty days each time they enter a new correctional facility with the aim
of mitigating violence between gangs of different races.188 On the other hand, lower federal
courts routinely shake off challenges to race-specific suspect descriptions. The Supreme
Court has consistently and repeatedly declined to intervene.189 All that can safely be said
is that at least in some instances, statistical discrimination will be subject to close judicial
scrutiny, and sometimes it won’t be. The cut point between those domains remains to be
defined.
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This is what economists call taste-based discrimination. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 14-15 (2d ed. 1971) (modeling taste-based discrimination as a “discrimination
coefficient,” which “acts as a bridge between money and net costs. Suppose an employer were faced with
the money wage rate PI of a particular factor; he is assumed to act as if PI(1 + di) were the net wage rate,
with di as his [discrimination coefficient] against this factor”).
185
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); see also Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737,
1747-55 (2016) (that the Georgia Supreme Court had made a “clearly erroneous” decision when it declined
to find that prosecution use of preemptory strikes in a capital case was not animated by a discriminatory
purpose in the face of lurid evidence to the contrary).
186
I am not sure, however, this conclusion would be warranted. Consider, for example, an action shown to
be tainted by racial animus, but that could be defended as narrowly tailored given different motivational
premises and additional evidentiary support. The so-called travel ban might have this character. For a
discussion somewhat short on illumination, see Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S.
Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017) (per curiam). For an extended discussion, see Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and
Antidiscrimination, 117 MICH. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2019).
187
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “We are all Different”: Statistical Discrimination and the Right to be
Treated as an Individual, 15 J. ETHICS 47, 54 (2011) (providing a formal definition of such rational
discrimination). This is what economists call statistical discrimination. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of
Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 24-27 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds.,
1973) (“Skin color and sex are cheap sources of information. Therefore prejudices (in the literal sense of
pre-judgments, judgments made in advance of the evidence) about such differentia can be easily
implemented ….”).
188
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
189
See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740
(2010) (denying certiorari in a case exempting race-based suspect selection from equal protection scrutiny);
Brown v. City of Oneanta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001) (same).
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Moreover, it seems likely that not all racial animus in the criminal justice system is
crisply articulated in the Queen’s English. Instead, we might expect the overt racial
labelings to be the exception, with race more commonly embedded in “tacit,” unspoken
understandings. 190 The only evidence of the latter’s operation may be downstream
differential effects on suspects and defendants of different races. In contrast to its strict
superintendence of overt classifications, however, the Court has rejected the argument that
a constitutional violation can be made out by a showing of disparate racial impacts. In
McCleskey v. Kemp, most importantly, the Court rejected an Equal Protection challenge to
Georgia’s capital punishment system based on econometric evidence of racial
disparities.191 Lower courts have extended that holding to the distinct context of statistical
evidence about the role of race in a single decision-maker’s actions over time (e.g., a single
district attorney over a number of years).192
Paradoxically, both the Court’s embrace of the racial intent rule and its repudiation
of a disparate treatment rule have been justified by the need to maintain the criminal justice
system in good working order. In McCleskey, Justice Powell’s majority opinion expressed
alarm that the defendant’s challenge would “throw[] into serious question the principles
that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”193 In Powell’s view it was inconceivable
that the Constitution would “require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that
correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice
system.” 194 On the other hand, the Court has explained decisions enforcing closer
invigilation of race’s role in the jury deliberation context as “necessary to prevent a
systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the
Sixth Amendment trial right.”195 The Court thus appears to believe that the legitimacy of a
criminal justice system simultaneously requires keen alertness to concerns of racial justice,
and also a willful blindness to such concerns.
Stated in summary form then, current constitutional jurisprudence compels judges
to maintain the stability of the criminal justice system by ignoring racial disparities, by
isolating racial classifications and by extirpating (some) racial animus. It is a doctrinal
status quo that fits poorly with emergent algorithmic realities.
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On the notion of tactic understandings, see Michael Polanyi, The logic of tacit inference, 41
PHILOSOPHY 1, 2-3 (1966).
191
481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987).
192
John H. Blume et. al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1771, 1794 (1998) (collecting cases); see also Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d. 612, 645, 648
(7th Cir. 2001) (finding no discriminatory purpose despite statistical showing of racial disparities in traffic
stops). But cf. Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp-and Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
1269, 1288 (2018) (flagging limits to McClesky’s scope).
193
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315.
194
Id. at 319.
195
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
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B.

How Equal Protection Fails to Speak in Algorithmic Terms

Equal Protection doctrine is sharply criticized by those who perceive it to embody
a judicial failure to account for the diffusion and impact of racial effects in society, let
alone our highly racially stratified criminal justice system.196 I set these concerns aside
here, and take the doctrine seriously on its own terms. Even then, I find reasons to doubt
that the current doctrine can respond effectively to the questions of race raised by
algorithmic criminal justice. The concerns of constitutional law simply do not map onto
the ways in which race impinges on algorithmic criminal justice. The result is a gap
between legal criteria and their objects.
Crucially, the two main doctrinal touchstones of bad intent and bad classifications
provide scant traction for the analysis of algorithmic criminal justice. Both hinge on
concepts that translate poorly, if at all, to the algorithmic context, and are not easily adapted
for application to that end. A focus on racial animus will almost never be fruitful. A focus
on classification leads to perverse and unjustified results. The replacement of unstructured
discretion with algorithmic precision, therefore, thoroughly destabilizes how Equal
Protection doctrine works on the ground. The resulting mismatches compel my conclusion
that a new framework for thinking about the pertinent racial equity questions is needed.
1.

The Trouble With Intent

Taking intent as a touchstone of Equal Protection concern directs attention to
questions at best tangential to the potential role of race in algorithmic criminal justice. To
be sure, problematic intent might enter into algorithmic design in different ways, one of
which is easily accounted for in doctrinal terms. But, in general, intent will rarely be the
crux of the matter.
To begin, I suspect that the notion of machine intentionality is sufficiently
counterintuitive to find no place in constitutional law. Speculation about a future of
“superintelligent” artificial intelligences aside,197 the transformation of training data into
new schemes of classification by machine learning or deep learning does not obviously
map onto familiar forms of human intentionality. The most advanced artificial intelligences
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Recent critiques include Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016)
(contending that “the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal Protection Clause in
most respects”); Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1828 (2012) (arguing
that the Court has “split equal protection into the separate domains … , one governing affirmative action
and the other discrimination against non-Whites” in a move that has made it systematically easier for white
plaintiffs to prevail”).
197
Cf. NICK BOSTRAM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 52 (2014) (defining
superintelligence as “intellects that outperform the very best human minds across many very general
cognitive domains”).
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can now pass the Turing test198 and defeat (human) world champions at Go.199 But even
these machines do not obviously possess the sort of psychological interiority commonly
thought to be a necessary predicate to intentionality. 200 Talk of machine intentionality,
therefore, is either premature or a badly framed metaphor. As a result, it is better to treat
the algorithm itself as irrelevant to the constitutional analysis so far as intentionality is
concerned.
Bracketing the machine-learning tool as agent, however, there are two possible
ways in which intention might enter the picture. First, an algorithm’s designer might be
motivated by either an animosity toward a racial group, or else a prior belief that race
correlates with criminality, and then design the algorithm on that basis. Barocas and Selbst
call this “masking.”201 Masking might occur through either a choice to use polluted training
data, or else the deliberate selection of some features but not others. For instance, it is wellunderstood that when employers ignore credit score information, they tend to search for
proxies that have the inadvertent effect of deepening racial disparities.202 A discriminatory
algorithm designer will leverage such knowledge to fashion instruments that yield the
disparate racial effects they believe to be warranted a priori. Without knowing the full
spectrum of features that could, conceivably, have been included in the training data—
which can be “enormous”203—it will be difficult or impossible to diagnose this kind of
conduct absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent.204 It will, moreover, be especially
difficult to show that but for race, a specific feature would have been included, as the
doctrine requires.205 A basic principle of “feature selection” instructs that one should “keep
the important features and discard the unimportant one.”206 To the extent that masking
occurs, therefore, it seems clear that the litigation process would rarely yield evidence of
such intentional manipulation of the algorithm’s design.
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In June 2014, an artificial intelligence passed the Turing test, arguably for the first time. Kevin Warwick
& Huma Shah, Can machines think? A report on Turing test experiments at the Royal Society, 28 J. EXP. &
THEO. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 989, 990 (2016). The Turing test involves human judgments about natural
language conversations between a computer and a machine; a machine passes the test if the human
observer is unable to distinguish human from machine.
199
Silver et al., supra note 88, at 490.
200
Accounts of this interiority vary. On one influential definition, intentions are “conduct-controlling proattitudes, ones which we are disposed to retain without reconsideration, and which play a significant role as
inputs to reasoning.” MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 20 (1987). On
another view, when S is doing A intentionally, S knows that she is doing A. G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION
11-15 (1963). Machines lack attitudes or self-knowledge in the relevant senses.
201
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 50, at 692 (“[D]ecision makers could knowingly and purposefully bias the
collection of data to ensure that mining suggests rules that are less favorable to members of the protected
class.”).
202
Robert Clifford and Daniel Shoag, “No More Credit Check Score”: Employer Credit Bans and Signal
Substitution 3 (Mat 2016), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shoag/files/clifford_and_shoag_final.pdf.
203
Athey, supra note 32, at 483.
204
Training data will often have so many potential features that inferring the reason for the inclusion of
some and exclusion of others will often not be feasible. Id. at 483.
205
Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory purpose requires
showing that government decision-maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”).
206
ALPAYDIM, supra note 31, at 73-74.
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Perhaps the most important reason to set aside the masking phenomena, however,
is the fact that it does not appear to be a significant one in practice. Part of the reason for
this is that racial animus has a performative, interpersonal aspect. Racial discrimination
commonly entails an effort by one group to “produce esteem for itself by lowering the
status of another group,”207 and correlatively producing a “set of ... privileges and benefits”
of superordinate group membership.208 Masking is a form of discrimination that involves
no interpersonal interaction, and no esteem-affirming performance. It might therefore be
no surprise that it is comparatively rare.
Intent, however, might be relevant in algorithmic criminal justice in a second more
commonly salient way. As Part I explained, the training data used to create a classificatory
function can be the product of biased or distorted decision-making. For example, in a
jurisdiction where African-Americans were targeted for frequent and unjustified police
contact, the pool of arrestees and convicted criminals may be biased by an
underrepresentation of non-black individuals. 209 A jurisdiction in which black
neighborhoods are underserved by police responses to emergency calls, in contrast, might
generate data on the distribution of crime with a black (or grey) hole in respect to AfricanAmerican neighborhoods. 210 A jurisdiction, moreover, might underserve black
neighborhoods by understaffing responses to 911 calls at the same time as concentrating a
disproportionate amount of street policing resources on the same neighborhoods. 211 An
algorithm trained on police-generated data from this jurisdiction is likely to allocate
resources in ways that reflect and perhaps entrench disparities in the way in which policing
resources are allocated.
The relevant intent in this example, moreover, differs in two important ways from
the canonical form of impermissible intent in Equal Protection case-law. First, in the
absence of an express policy, the operation of racial preferences by officials in activities
that produce training data will generally be highly decentralized and uncoordinated.
Policing, and to a lesser extent bail determinations and sentencing, are dispersed rather than
centralized forms of state action. Individual officers or magistrates have a large degree of
discretion in consequence of their sheer numerosity and the difficulty of monitoring their
207

Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995). A similar idea is introduced in George A. Akerlof,
Discriminatory, Status-Based Wages Among Tradition-Oriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut
Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265, 265 (1985).
208
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713 (1993). For a seminal account
of this concept, see DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
209
For findings of such disparities, see, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (New York); Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and
Observation (FIO) Study Results, Oct 8, 2014, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/boston-policecommissioner-announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fio-study-results (Boston).
210
See, e.g., Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 123041, ¶ 4, 1 N.E.3d
976, 979 (describing allegations of longer response times to 911 calls in minority neighborhoods in
Chicago).
211
As appears to be the case with Chicago. Id.; Aamer Madhani, Chicago police and ACLU agree to stopand-frisk safeguards, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2015,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/07/chicago-police-agree-reform-stop-and-frisk/31277041/.
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decisions. It is hardly clear how a court could or would make a determination of ‘intent’
when confronted with an extensive multitude ungoverned by formal decision procedures.
Constitutional doctrine has not developed an intellectual tool-kit for aggregating a large
number of dispersed individual motives so as to ascertain whether a but-for standard of
intentionality has been met by a collectivity.
An analogous, but easier, problem arises in the legislative context, where many
individuals bring to bear potentially diverse motives in order to shape singular institutional
acts with the force of law. Equal Protection law has struggled with how to conceptualize
the concept of “intent” in the legislative context so unsuccessfully that one influential
commentator has advocated wholesale retreat from judicial accounting for legislators’
subjective intents; in his view, the task of principled aggregation is simply too hard for
judges.212 Unlike legislatures, a plurality of geographically and temporally diffused cohorts
of officials (whether police or magistrates) lack any stable procedures or mechanisms for
eliciting and formalizing a singular intent.213 Their ability to form a coherent, let alone
legally relevant, intent may seriously be doubted.
Even if such an intentionality could be derived from a diffuse haze of discrete
policing decisions or detention-related judgments, it is not clear whether the mere
incorporation by reference of such historical judgments into new, forward-looking
algorithmic tools would trigger Equal Protection Clause concern. Even if historical intent
can be inferred successfully, there remains a question of whether reliance on flawed
historical data counts as a constitutionally relevant form of intent. It is certainly possible
for bad intent to endure over time. Indeed, the Court has invalidated states’ laws enacted
to preserve “white supremacis[m]” many decades before litigation began, and in so doing
rejected the notion that “events occurring in the [intervening] years [could have]
legitimated the provision.”214 But there are no Equal Protection cases in which the Court
has considered outcomes resulting from concededly discriminatory official action that in
turn was adopted by a new and different actor as the rationale for new, forward-looking
policy.215 In short, there is simply no way of knowing whether a ‘relay-race’ theory of bad
intent would pass muster in constitutional law.
Perhaps the closest analog to this problem of governmental reliance on flawed data
arises in the Fourth Amendment context. In that domain, the Court has declined to treat the
212

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 533-34
(2016) (insisting that “ultimate determinations of constitutional validity should always depend on the
content and effects of challenged legislation, not the subjective intentions of the enacting legislatures”).
213
Cf. CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILLIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF
GROUP AGENTS 81 (2012) (“[A[ group’s performance as an agent depends on how it is organized: on its
rules and procedures for forming its propositional attitudes ....). In most cases, the groups relevant to
algorithmic criminal justice have no such rules or procedures.
214
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
215
The closest analog of which I am aware arises under the Fair Housing Act, where there can be a
question whether a municipal decision on, say, taxes or zoning causes a pattern of residential racial
segregation. Cf. Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (demanding a showing of “robust causality”). But the question here is
not one of causation: It is a question of whether the intentions of the original police or magistrate ought to
be imputed to the algorithm given their influence on the training data.

- 38 Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144831
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144831

flaws in a first-moving official’s behavior as infecting a second, subsequently acting
official’s decision to depend on that first officer. For example, when a police officer relies
on a recalled warrant mistakenly distributed by another police force, the latter’s mistake of
law is not imputed to the arresting officer such that evidence must be excluded.216 Although
the analogy is inexact,217 the Fourth Amendment’s stingy treatment of imputed fault when
the unlawful action of official X becomes the basis of official Y’s otherwise lawful act
suggests that an intent-focused Equal Protection lens will have limited traction in the
algorithmic criminal justice context. For there is no reason to think that the rules of imputed
motivation should vary between the Equal Protection and the Fourth Amendment contexts.
But that theoretical problem may be precisely that—theoretical. Even if flawed
training data were identified, it seems unlikely that its tainted nature could suffice to
establish a constitutional concern in practice. Any moderately competent municipality
found using flawed data would hardly concede that it was doing so intentionally. Rather, it
would be far more likely to defend its decision as the best option, faute de mieux, given
historically shaped constraints. Because a constitutional violation cannot be shown unless
the state relied on race as a ground of decision, as opposed to acting in spite of race,218 this
defense would likely succeed. As a practical matter, therefore, the narrow definition of
intent in Equal Protection doctrine would likely insulate racially tainted training data from
legal attack.
This means that none of the pathways for integrating intent into the Equal
Protection analysis of algorithmic criminal justice are likely to prove fruitful. None of them
are well suited for a consideration of the ways in which race in practice interacts with
algorithmic criminal justice. Equal Protection doctrine was designed to police the
dispersed, open-ended discretionary judgments of street-level officials. It does a poor job
when applied to the very different context of algorithm design and application. It is hence
necessary to consider the logic of anti-classification as an alternative lens.
2.

The Trouble with Classification

The anticlassification strand of Equal Protection doctrine prohibits the government
from “classify[ing] people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden
category” such as race.219 At first blush, it seems a natural fit: Algorithms work by applying
categories to training data (when defining features) and then generating novel classification
rules to apply to test data. A rule to the effect that race (or, say, ethnicity) could not be used
either as a feature or as an element of a classifier absent narrow tailoring to a compelling
216

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15
(1995) (same result for errors by a judicial administrator). The Court, however, is willing to impute another
officer’s knowledge of information salient to the legality of a search when doing so renders a search lawful.
Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971). Although these positions can be squared, it is striking that
imputation is available only when it expands state authority.
217
The availability of exclusion in Fourth Amendment cases is said to turn on the deterrent effect of that
remedy. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. The consequential focus on deterrence is absent when one is concerned
with attributions of intentionality.
218
Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
219
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003).
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state interest would seem to be a natural fit. Such a rule, however, would be unmoored
from the justifications for an anticlassificatory rule. It would also engender results that
contradict the assumed purposes of the rule.
The anticlassification account of Equal Protection is premised on two main
justifications. First, it is motivated by a concern that the state’s use of racial classifications
will facilitate or amplify private discrimination.220 This worry is in turn premised on the
empirical claim that a “perception ... fostered by [government]” of differences between
racial groups “can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice.”221 The foundation
of this empirical claim, to be sure, is hardly clear. Why would the communicative effect of
state racial classifications entail a legitimation of private animus? The causal link here is
not obvious.222 One interpretation of the Court’s argument might start with the Court’s
claim that race is “‘in most circumstances irrelevant’ to any constitutionally acceptable
legislative purpose.”223 Read sympathetically, the Court appears to be saying that because
race is irrelevant to the vindication of legitimate government ends, the observation that the
state is treating race nevertheless as salient has the effect of propagating a false popular
belief in racial hierarchies.224 The second possible interpretation of an anticlassification
rule turns on a nonconsequentialist, deontological intuition. That is, according to some
Justices, it is a moral axiom that the state must treat all persons as individuals, and such
220

Anderson v. Martin, 375 US. 399, 402 (1964) (holding that a Louisiana statute, which mandated the
designation of a candidate's race on election ballots, violated equal protection because it enlisted the power
of the state to enforce private racial prejudices).
221
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995).
222
It is not clear why the reasonable observer would draw an inference about a racial group, though,
instead of an inference that the government was unjustified and irrational in its action. In any event, the
claim that racial identity is not salient in a context where racial preferences retain a powerful hold is a
deeply dubious one. For an estimate of the prevalence of racial animus using an innovative empirical
method, see Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, The cost of racial animus on a black candidate: Evidence using
Google search data, 118 J. PUB. ECON. 26, 26-28 (2014) (using Google data to estimate the prevalence and
geographic variation of anti-black sentiment).
223
McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943). Notice that the Court’s argument here is crucially ambiguous. It could be that an individual’s
race is irrelevant to many legitimate state ends, but that the persistence of racism as an ambient social
phenomenon is relevant to how the state can achieve those ends. The Court’s formulation elides this
difference, and therefore misses the possibility that racism may be salient to the state’s means-end
rationality, even if race per se is not.
224
Chris S. Crandall et al., Social Norms and the Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle
for Internalization, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 359, 359 (2002) finding that “[t]he public
expression of prejudice toward 105 social groups was very highly correlated with social approval of that
expression. Participants closely adhere to social norms when expressing prejudice, evaluating scenarios of
discrimination, and reacting to hostile jokes”); Katie M. Duchscherer & John F. Dovidio, When Memes are
Mean: Appraisals of and Objections to Stereotypic Memes, 2 TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES PSYCHOL. SCI. 335,
335 (2016) (online experiment involving memes about Asian stereotypes in which “seeing another person
object to the meme increased the likelihood that White participants would object . . . but only when the race
of the person was unstated, and not when the person was Asian”); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al.,
Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 993, 993 (1994) (study demonstrating that cues from other people that racial discrimination is
permissible or impermissible affect whether a person will condemn a racist remark); Fletcher A. Blanchard
et al., Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 993, 995–96 (1994) (studies on students showing that hearing others condemn racism
led to anti-racist opinions, while hearing others condone racism weakened anti-racist opinions).
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individualization precludes any taking account of their race. 225 This moral demand for
individuation entails demanding judicial scrutiny for all racial classifications.
There are, to be sure, reasons for skepticism about these moral and theoretical
premises of the anticlassification principle.226 But even bracketing those hesitations, and
taking those justifications on face value, there is still no reason to think that the logic of
anticlassification strongly militates against the use of race either as a feature or as an
element of a classifier by machine-learning tools. To the contrary, as a matter of either
precedent or logic, Equal Protection law can accommodate racially sensitive algorithmic
criminal justice.
Consider the first concern about the communicative effect of racial classifications.
It is not clear that an algorithmic classifier is the sort of racial criterion that courts perceive
to be objectionable. Rather, it is somewhat akin to the explicit use of race in criminal
suspect identifications, which has to date elicited scant constitutional concern.227 Suspect
descriptions instead operate as ‘given’ elements of the regulatory backdrop. Courts have
not been wholly clear about why such suspect descriptions do not elicit careful scrutiny.
One possible explanation is that judges believe suspect descriptions to be based on extrinsic
facts, rather than airy suppositions about racial types, and as such not the kind of
generalizations that trigger anticlassificatory concerns. This logic might be extended to the
algorithmic context. Race-based feature selections would then trigger no more
constitutional concern than race-based suspect descriptions. The argument would be that a
classifier based on training data is akin to a suspect description of a familiar sort insofar as
both are predicated on historical facts about crime.228 Indeed, an advocate of algorithmic
225

Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the heart of this
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as
individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.”). The same position is articulated,
with respect to gender in DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 168–69 (1999) (arguing that to
treat a woman on the basis of “information that relates to the whole group or class” to which she belongs is
“to fail to treat her respectfully as an individual, and potentially to commit an injustice”). This argument
does not rest on the stigmatizing consequences of race-based action.
226
For devastating critiques of the idea of colorblindness, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF
INTEGRATION 155-79 (2010) (describing the concept as “confused” and “incoherent”); Reva B. Siegel,
Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social
Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 81-83 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind
Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
29 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998). For an originalist critique of anticlassification rules as
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, in favor of a “duty-to-protect” view, see Christopher R.
Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 3 (2008).
227
For a collection of cases, see R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1075, 1095-96 (2001). Note that this is not a
function of the inclusion of other considerations. Classifications that include race as one among many
elements can run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note --, at 16-17 (noting
conflicting precedent on this point).
228
Are algorithms different because the historical data upon which they are based is not specifically linked
to a particular crime? Consider, however, the decision in Brown v. City of Oneonta, for example, which
declined to impose constitutional tort liability when a description of a black male suspect provoked
Oneonta police to stop more than two hundred “non-white persons,” including women, encountered on the
streets. Although the stops there were in a trivial sense based on a historical fact, the connection between
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criminal justice might observe that human observers are more likely than a machine to err
in their deployment of race as a signal of criminality than an algorithm.229 They might
further contend it is perverse to object to efforts to mitigate the effects of race on criminaljustice outcomes through the substitution of machine for human judgments.
A second reason to think that an anticlassificatory logic does not work well in this
domain would focus upon the absence of any communicative effect from algorithmic
criminal justice. Many of the algorithms discussed in Part I are sheltered from disclosure
by trade-secrets law, and hence are not disclosed presently to the public.230 Even if they
were to be disclosed in the course of litigation, it would likely be under the auspices of a
protective order. To the extent that anticlassification rules rest on a concern about the
communicative effects of state action, the use of an algorithmic tool that is wholly opaque
should mitigate those concerns. More generally, the Supreme Court has been more
accommodating of the conceded use of race when it is somewhat obscured from public
view.231 A state actor that relies upon an algorithmic tool, but that muffles the precise
content of that tool from the public through trade secrets law or otherwise, might mitigate
the most powerful challenges on Equal Protection grounds. Stated more positively, the
much maligned quality algorithmic “opacity” has the benefit of dampening troublesome
communicative effects for racial classification. Advocacy of transparency has the perverse
effect of courting the expressive harms that Equal Protection tries to minimize.
A related, if somewhat subtler, question arises if race is employed as a feature of
the training data—i.e., for each discrete observation (individual) in the training data, race
is recorded—but race plays no role in the labels used to describe the classification task, or
in the tools used to identify an appropriate function. Does that approach have a
constitutionally impermissible communicative effect?
Northpointe omitted race from the training data used for Compas. 232 But this
appears to reflect corporate risk aversion rather than an effort at legal compliance. Current
law does not address whether the availability of race as an input into the deliberative
process that results in state action violates the Equal Protection Clause on anticlassification
grounds. To be sure, there is language in earlier precedent that suggests that any racial trace

that fact and the subsequent police actions was very strained. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 779
(2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). The same might be said of algorithmic tools.
229
See, e.g., Kleinberg et al., Human decision, supra note 133, at 52, fig. 9 (making precisely this argument
in graphical form).
230
See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920883 (collecting examples, and arguing for more
transparency). More generally, algorithms used by commercial actors are also “secret. ” Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1, 10–11 (2014)
231
See Strauss, supra note 178, at 24 (noting “the Court's insistence on nontransparency” in affirmative
action cases). An unpublished paper by Strauss on ‘do it but don’t tell me,’ makes this point even more
forcefully.
232
Angwin et al., supra note 15.
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in official deliberation raises a constitutional problem.233 But the weight of precedential
evidence (as well as common sense) suggests that the mere fact that a decisionmaker can
observe the race of subjects does not mean that it is therefore invalid. As a practical matter,
many front-line state officials encounter suspects, defendants, and citizens and thereby
directly perceive their interlocutors’ race. 234 Similarly, the federal judiciary must—and
indeed does—routinely recognize the race of litigants in order to reach judgments on
statutory and constitutional discrimination claims, even when it is not strictly necessary.235
Finally, recent affirmative action jurisprudence implies (without expressly stating) that the
bare fact of racial awareness is not sufficient to state a constitutional violation. The
University of Texas, whose admission policy was reviewed and upheld by the Court in
2016, considered race as part of its PAI, and this alone did not suffice to generate a
constitutional problem.236 In short, it seems tolerably likely that an algorithmic criminal
justice tool can use race as a feature in training data without triggering constitutional
concern.
What of the argument against the state’s use of racial classifications from its
putative obligation to treat individuals as individuals rather than as members of groups?
The moral logic of individuation trains on “intentional uses” of racial classifications, not
merely coincidental or happenstance entanglements with race.237 That logic might seem to
have traction here since algorithmic criminal justice entails a decision-maker relying on
group membership rather than accounting for all relevant characteristics of an individual.
But this is not quite right. In the absence of masking,238 there is no human decision
to assign costs or benefits on the basis of a racial classification with algorithmic criminal
justice. And race is generally not going to be used as a substitute for more fine-grained
traits. In any case, merely withholding race information does not ensure that an algorithm
will not point toward race as a salient proxy. Machine learning algorithms take training
data (with or without a race parameter), and use them to generate a new classifier, which
can then be applied to test data.239 The fact that an algorithm is not initially supplied with
an impermissible ground of decision as a feature of training data does not mean that it will
not end up including that criterion in its classifier. Machine-learning tools are powerful and
useful precisely because they can detect regularities in a data-set that would not manifest
in the absence of computational tools. Although machine-learning tools can be designed to
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Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race ....”).
234
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471 (2004) (“For a half-century now, the Constitution
has prohibited state action that classifies on the basis of race, yet as Americans have debated the
implications of that principle, few have thought it barred collecting racial data.”).
235
Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 408 (2012) (documenting courts’ “unsettled
and unsettling approach” to the recognition of litigants’ racial identities).
236
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016) (noting that “race is given weight as a
subfactor within the PAI”).
237
ANDERSON, supra note 227, at 155. Anderson is discussing “racial preference” here, but her point
applies to racial classifications too.
238
See supra text accompanying notes 201 to 204.
239
See supra text accompanying notes 79 to 81.

- 43 Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144831
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144831

be “private,” in the sense of eschewing reliance on certain traits,240 they can also “help
pinpoint reliable proxies” for traits even without information about the distribution of such
traits in the population. 241 If race emerges as part of the classifier, this is not an
“intentional” action in any meaningful sense—and yet it is still a classification on the basis
of race.
The official deploying the algorithm, moreover, cannot be faulted for failing to
engage in sufficient individuation: She supplies granular training data, selects among
different computational tools, and then applies these tools to the specific facts about the
individual being classified. 242 Even if the training data includes race information, the
official has not designated race as a salient trait in any meaningful way. A decision-making
process in which no human actor has elected to employ race as a criterion of action is not
fairly characterized as an instance in “the government distributes burdens or benefits on
the basis of individual racial classifications.”243 The argument against algorithmic criminal
justice from the moral demand for individuation, therefore, fails.
There is a one final argument for the inapplicability of anticlassification logic here.
Race is commonly thought to be already highly correlated with socioeconomic
characteristics related to criminogenic and victimization distributions. It might hence be
reasonably anticipated that many algorithmic tools designed to be predictive of criminality
will, even absent any race feature in the training data, generate a function that either
mimics, or is a good approximation of, racial distributions in the population. Given this, it
is possible that “by remaining blind to sensitive attributes, a classification rule can select
exactly the opposite of what is intended.”244 That is, the absent of a de facto predictive trait
from the training data can generate systematic and serious errors in prediction.
A simple example from outside the machine learning context illustrates this
possibility. Imagine that wearing a particular baseball cap is used as a proxy for drug
possession by police (say, because it may signal gang membership). Both blacks and whites
wear this cap. For 100% of whites, and for zero percent of blacks, the cap is an accurate
signal of drug possession. Let us say that police stop all those encountered wearing the cap,
and this population is 75% white and 25% black. Because the cap generates a 75 percent
success rate, its categorical (and colorblind) use might be deemed a meritorious criterion.
But the efficacy of searches, and the avoidance of needless hassle for minorities, can be
increased by limiting the instrument to white suspects.245 Colorblindness here generates
240

Cynthia Dwork & Aaron Roth, The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy, 9 FOUND’NS &
TRENDS IN THEORETICAL COMP. SCI. 211, 216-18 (2014) (developing a related concept of differential
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Barocas & Selbst, supra note 50, at 693.
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Kroll et al., supra note 38, at 682 (noting that in machine learning, “decision rules evolve on the fly—
they are not specified directly, but are inferred from the data”).
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Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). What if the
government actor designing the algorithm fails to prevent the algorithm from homing in on race? I read the
doctrine not to problematize such culpable omissions.
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Kroll et al., supra note 38, at 686.
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This example is drawn from Ian Ayres, Outcome tests of racial disparities in police practices, 4 JUST.
POL. RES. 131, 139 (2002).
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substantial and avoidable social costs, and can be corrected, however, by simply accounting
for race.246
In the machine-learning context, a fix entails the creation of a predictive tool that
assigns individuals from different demographics to different classifications even though
they exhibit the same behavioral traits.247 Lest this seem obviously beyond the legal and
moral pale, consider that one study of probation and parole decisions found that the
decision to omit race from a machine-learning algorithm, the accuracy of recidivism
predictions declined “by about 7 percentage points.”248 The procedural purity demanded
by an anti-classification rule, in sum, would come at a high price in terms of accuracy in
algorithmic application.249
3.

The Lessons of Algorithmic Technology for Equal Protection Doctrine

Current doctrinal approaches to constitutional racial equality arose after the Court
had abandoned its early twentieth century interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as
“a rationality test ... invoked sporadically to strike down economic regulation.”250 They
were configured in a context of judicial efforts to dismantle educational segregation in the
Jim Crow south, and then against a backlash to the Civil Rights Movement. 251 It was
probably inevitable that the legal conception of racial discrimination as a matter of
intention or classification would reflect the judicial concern with the discretionary choices
of the police officer, school board president, or state legislator—i.e., the modal problems
thrown up by mid-century civil rights law.
The institutional context of Equal Protection, however, has changed. Today,
perhaps the sharpest and most controversial questions of racial justice are presented in the
criminal justice domain. The emergence of algorithmic tools in that domain present
questions poorly fitted to the doctrinal templates of intention and classification. This loose
fit arises because the ways in which race filters into individual officials’ discretionary
criminal justice decisions are very different from the ways in which it can infuse
algorithmic tools. Equal Protection, as a result, poses questions that are simply not relevant
to the operation of algorithmic criminal justice. It is a superseded legal technology so far
246

See Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through Awareness, 2012 PROC. 3RD INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL
COMPUTER SCI. CONF. 214 (formally demonstrating this result); accord Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven
Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 918 (2017) (arguing that the risk of omitted
variable bias means that controlling for sensitive demographic variables may sometimes be necessary to
avoid biased results).
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Bryce W. Goodman, Economic Models of (Algorithmic) Discrimination 3, in 29TH CONFERENCE ON
NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS (2016). For a parallel result using the Compas data, see Nabi
& Shpitser, supra note 19, at 8.
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Richard Berk, The Role of Race in Forecasts in Violent Crime, 1 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 231, 235 (2009).
249
Could such a use of race be justified as a narrowly tailored response to a compelling state interest? It is
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Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 216
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Id. at 217-18; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 328-37
(2014) (consider the judicial forms of this backlash).
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as algorithmic criminal justice goes. As more state power is channeled through algorithmic
channels, it will become increasingly obsolete.
On the one hand, the manner in which algorithmic criminal justice unfolds
generally means that are few opportunities for intentional discrimination of the familiar
kind. The process of feature selection, to be sure, creates opportunities to use race as an
input, to intentionally omit race in order to generate discriminatory patterns, or to choose
an insufficient number of variables in ways that mimic the same effect.252 But this sort of
masking will be very hard to discover (much as prosecutorial or judicial animus is hard to
identify now). It does not, at least on the basis of current evidence, appear to be a significant
problem. On the other hand, the logic of anticlassification might first seem to provide a
firm foundation for regulating algorithmic criminal justice. But that logic turns out again
to be a bad fit. The use of race in criminal justice algorithms is akin to the use of race in
suspect descriptions. It lacks both the intentionality and the expressive spillovers that
render non-individuation troubling. Just as in the context of race-based suspect
descriptions, moreover, it will sometimes be necessary to use race to achieve substantively
accurate policy results.
In the dialog between Equal Protection and algorithmic criminal justice, therefore,
I suspect that constitutional law has much to learn and less to teach. A set of tools developed
for a regulatory world of dispersed state actors, occasionally motivated by naked animus,
cannot be mechanically translated into a world of centralized, computational decisionmaking. Even after law has made its contribution, therefore, the question of racial equity
in algorithmic criminal justice remains open for debate—while the relevance and moral
acuity of equality jurisprudence should be viewed as in serious doubt absent more intensive
rethinking.
III.

Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice Beyond Constitutional Law

The failure of constitutional law to provide a meaningful benchmark of racial
equality is important in its own right. Yet it leaves the study of algorithmic criminal justice
unmoored. It means there is no normatively attractive, empirically tractable way of
evaluating the race effects of big-data predictive tools. This Part fills that gap. In order to
do so, I will start by offering my own account of the normative stakes of racial equity in
criminal justice to fill the vacuum left by our deficient constitutional doctrine. My view is
that the reason for concern about racial equity in criminal justice generally is that fact that
our policing and adjudicative institutions play significant roles in the reproduction and
entrenchment of social stratification. In a racially segmented society, when a person’s life
chances are defined importantly by their race, I believe this to be a moral wrong of the first
order.
With that normative benchmark in hand, I turn to the extensive computer-science
literature on the question. That scholarship has developed a series of definitions of what is
alternatively defined as algorithmic fairness or algorithmic discrimination. The literature
has focused first on precise mathematical formulations of each definition, and second on
252
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the generation of impossibility theorems—i.e., formal proofs that it is not possible to
maximize two or more parameters that in some fashion measure the racial effects of an
algorithm. Because the computer-science literature has been “silent on the choice [between
different understandings of fairness],”253 mere specification of alternative conceptions of
racial equity is not sufficient for any tractable conclusions about public policy. By applying
my account of racial equity in criminal justice to these standards, I aim to make progress
on determining which technical conception captures something of normative significance.
Two caveats are useful here. First, for the sake of clarity of exposition, I focus here
on a binary between white and black defendants, even though this obscures the more
complex racial dynamics of American policing today.254 A focus on a black/white binary
is warranted here as a way of clarifying the fundamental conceptual stakes. It is obviously
inadequate as a general account of racial equity in policing, and I do not intend it as such.
Moreover, I should emphasize again that my aim here is not to offer a judgment in respect
to any specific algorithm, but a more general analytic approach. Much depends on the
particular costs and benefits that in situ flow from a given instrument.
Second, a racial-equity analysis of algorithmic criminal justice should not be a
comparative one. It is not sufficient, that is, to point to a superseded technology that relies
upon flawed human discretion and that already generates large racial effects, as a
justification for new, slightly less flawed technologies for allocating coercion. The mere
fact that the status quo ante is characterized by racial injustice does not legitimatize
proposals that preserve or extend some substantial part of that injustice. No one thinks (or
should think) the Jim Crow regime laudable, for example, merely because it followed
slavery. Improvements in the status quo are a necessary but not sufficient condition for
racial equity to be satisfied. It seems likely that the shift to algorithmic tools in criminal
justice will be an enduring one. At the moment that a new policy is introduced, with
potential path-dependent effects that will unfold over many iterations of policy-making, it
is especially important to understand the conditions under which that policy promotes
racial equity: Far better, that is, to embed that principle at a policy’s inception than to attend
years of damage that cannot ever wholly be unraveled. Each technology ought to be
evaluated on its merits and in light of its consequences. It is plainly inadequate to say that
the technology should be adopted because and only because it makes a step change in the
woeful status quo.
A.

The Stakes of Racial Equity in Contemporary American Criminal Justice

Why care about racial equity in criminal law? Without an answer to that question—
and we have already seen that constitutional law doesn’t give a convincing one—no
253

Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art 29 (May 2017)
[hereinafter “Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice”], https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09207; see also Sorelle
A. Friedler, Carlos Scheidegger, and Suresh Venkatasubramanian, On the (im)possibility of fairness 12
(2016) https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07236 (“Choice in mechanism [i.e., feature design) must thus be tied to
an explicit choice in worldview,” and in particular a choice to prioritize either individual or group fairness).
254
Cf. Ramiro Martinez, Incorporating Latinos and immigrants into policing research, 6 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL. 57, 57 (2007) (documenting the “lack of research on Latino/as and Latino groups” in relation to
the criminal justice system).
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analysis of algorithmic criminal justice’s racial equity effects gets off the ground.
Accordingly, I start by offering my own evaluation of the racial stakes of criminal justice.
I do not intend to break new ground here, but rather aim to set forth clearly a distinct
normative position respecting racial equity in the criminal justice context.
American criminal justice implicates racial equity concerns because of their
dynamic effects on racial stratification. Historical and contemporary empirical evidence
suggests that both in the past and now, criminal justice has been invoked in public discourse
and applied in state practice so as to predictably exacerbate the subordinate status of
African Americans in general. The dynamic (re-)production of iniquitous social
stratification—beyond the bare facts of animus and classification—is what should grip our
collective conscience. 255
At a very general level of abstraction, four causal mechanisms link criminal justice
institutions to racial stratification. First, inherent black criminality has been invoked for
more than a hundred years as public justification for more punitive interventions against
African-Americans, and for the withholding of social services from them on moral desert
grounds. Second, black communities have in practice been both over-policed—in the sense
of subjected to higher rates of coercive interventions—and also under-protected—in the
sense of not receiving the same measure of protective legal resources that nonblack
communities receive. As a result of this inefficient allocation of policing resources, state
coercion has not resulted in lower levels of private coercion for African-Americans. Third,
pivotal actors within the criminal justice system, such as police, prosecutors, and judges,
have tended to treat black suspects and defendants more harshly than white ones. Hence,
the per-capital cost of crime suppression has been greater for blacks than whites. Fourth,
the spillover effects from disparate policing for black families and communities appear to
be larger in magnitude than the spillover effects in white communities, even controlling for
the extent of coercion. The net result of these mechanisms is that criminal justice imposes
“compounding”256 disadvantage upon African-Americans as a group that works as a brake
on individuals’ efforts to rise in the social hierarchy. Even if not all African-Americans are
impeded by this headwind, enough are that we can meaningfully talk of persisting racial
stratification to which criminal justice institutions have contributed. These diverse causal
pathways underpin the need for careful attention to the manner in which formal criminal
justice institutions can undermine the status of African-Americans as a group.
Rather than offering normative and empirical justifications for each element of this
position—a task that would require a book rather than an article—I sketch some suggestive
evidence for these causal linkages between criminal justice and racial stratification. I start
255

Racial stratification is objectionable on (at least) two grounds. First, it embodies what Tim Scanlon calls
a manifest failure of equal concern on the part of the state. T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY
MATTER? (2018). Second, stratification generates deadweight welfare losses in the form of unused human
capital, psychological and social harms, and violence that flows from the latter. Of course, to the extent that
such dynamic consequences have normative salience, it is because of a predicate obligation of equal
concern toward the disadvantaged.
256
I draw this term from Deborah Hellman, Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid Compounding
Injustice, in FOUNDATION OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW 105, 107 (Tarunadh Khaitan and High
Collins, eds., 2018). Hellman’s use of the term assumes an original act of discrimination; my use does not
(although discriminatory acts are woven across the operation of criminal justice).
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with history (although I do not want to suggest that the state’s obligations here rest on its
historical responsibility for creating racial stratification in the first instance, rather than its
role in perpetuating that condition). At the beginning of the twentieth century, national
public discourse about “law and order became racialized,” even as “conviction and
incarceration rates for African Americans jumped disproportionately.”257 As the leading
historical work by Khalil Gibran Mohammed vividly demonstrates, Progressive-era
academics, journalists, and politicians in the north linked crime to African-Americans, at
the same time as they downplayed white ethnic groups as sources of crime. By the early
1940s, Mohammed explains, ‘“Black” stood as the unmitigated signifier of deviation (and
deviance) from the normative category of “White.”’258 Concomitant to this rhetorical shift,
urban policing and carceral resources were disproportionately allocated to AfricanAmericans who were in the process of migrating up from the rural south. In northern cities
in particular, police singled out blacks for intense surveillance and coercion.259 This pushed
up the rate of black incarceration and the proportion of the prison population that was
black. 260 The black share of that population never subsequently dropped. 261 Racialized
mass incarceration, that is, was at its inception a product of a moral panic stoked by
northern elites in respect to the growing presence of an African-American population that
previously had been the South’s ‘problem.’
Today, racial disparities characterize both victimization rates and exposure to
criminal-justice coercion. Black men are more likely than white men to be victims of
serious (index) crimes such as murder.262 They are also more likely to be arrested and
incarcerated than white peers.263 In many urban contexts, blacks and whites also experience
widely varying chances of being stopped by police.264 Moving from the policing to the
adjudicative phase of the criminal justice process, common sentencing regimes impose
disparate treatment on similarly situated offenders of different races by the use of different
penalty structures for behavior closely associated with different racial groups. 265 As a
result, one in eight black men in their twenties is in prison or jail on any given day, while
some 69 percent of black high school dropouts are imprisoned over their lifetime,
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compared with just 15% for white high school dropouts.266 For young black men, therefore,
prison has thus become a predictable part of the life course.267
Note also that the intensive concentration of policing and incarceration resources
along racial lines is not a rational, cost-justified response to crime. As I have argued
elsewhere, there is evidence that some of the most common forms of policing black
communities are inefficacious.268 Black incarceration rates are also too high to be plausibly
justified. One estimate suggests that reducing incarceration rates from 2004 to 1984 levels,
and investing the resulting savings in an increased police presence, would lead to a net
decline in violent crime nationally of about 130,000 incidents.269 Even if racial minorities
benefit from the public safety produced by the criminal justice system, therefore, it is also
at a highly disproportionate and unnecessary direct cost.
Is part of this burden, though, justified by higher black crime rates? Even if we
assume that “African Americans engage in significantly higher rates of street crime,” there
is evidence that conditions of “racial segregation and concentrated disadvantage”—i.e.,
environmental conditions that themselves are a function of non-race-neutral policies—
explain much of the difference between different racial groups’ crime rates.270 That is, it is
not so much that race is causally related to criminality, but that African-Americans are
subject to forms of social and economic stratification and segmentation that conduce to
criminality. Paradoxically, these underlying conditions are in an important respect a
function of the federal government’s decision to shift resources away from building human
and social capital to policing crime. The intensification of policing and incarceration since
the early 1970s, the historian Elizabeth Hinton has argued, was a conscious, and racially
tinged, policy substitute for Great Society programs that could have mitigated those
conditions. 271 That substitution could be reversed. As the sociologist Patrick Sharkey has
demonstrated, it is precisely the local recreation of social services, and the concomitant
creation of social capital, that has been a leading contributor to recent declines in crime. In
one empirical study, Sharkey and his colleagues thus estimated that “the addition of 10
community nonprofits per 100,000 residents leads to a 9 percent decline in the murder rate,
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a 6 percent decline in the violent crime rate, and a 4 percent decline in the property crime
rate.” 272
Finally, the direct costs of black incarceration are only part of the distinctive burden
imposed by the current criminal justice system on racial minorities. Current crime
suppression also imposes considerable collateral costs (or externalities) asymmetrically on
racial minorities. To begin with, the immediate cost of encounters with police is racially
asymmetric. The black experience of a police stop is reliably correlated with “stigma,
trauma, anxiety and depression,”273 because of the historically fraught nature of relations
between American police and racial minorities. African-Americans are, moreover,
commonly subject to policing measures that are not generally employed against white
citizens—such as pretextual vehicular stops—and are quite aware that they are objects of
disparate treatment based on the presumption of black criminality.274 They are also quite
aware of the stigmatizing connection between race and criminality drawn since the
beginning of the twentieth century. Even today, “demography-based suspicion is among
the key social facts that define American life in the late twentieth century and early twentyfirst centuries.”275 Ethnographic studies paint a bleak picture of interactions between police
and young black men as marked by distrust and fear, and as a source of widespread
alienation and disaffection.276 Against the background of this broadly shared supposition
of the relationship of criminality and race, public encounters with police can, even if
warranted, humiliate and rob innocent racial minorities of the “ability to present themselves
to other people as the ordinary people they are.”277
These effects generate further negative spillovers. As Randall Kennedy cogently
observed three decades ago, African-American men experience a “racial tax” from
American criminal justice systems—even if they have no contact with it—because police
and citizens are prone to perceive their race as a proxy for criminality, and hence to
configure them as potential criminals rather than potential victims. 278 Recent empirical
272
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work has confirmed Kennedy’s account of the externalities of criminal justice for minority
groups as a whole. African-American men hence continue to receive disfavored treatment
in a wide array of economic and social contexts that limit an important slice of life
opportunities. 279 The increased risk of contact with police, and hence incarceration,
undermines the economic and social resources available to the larger racial cohort
embedded in the same geographic community. 280 One in four black children also
experiences parental incarceration—an experience that directly and negatively impacts
their health and education outcomes. 281 Most notably, and dismayingly, black parental
incarceration is associated with a 49% increase in infant mortality, an increase that has no
parallel among white families affected by incarceration.282 Not even the children, in other
words, are spared. Rather, a concentration of policing and incarceration within black
communities generates distinctive burdens with no parallel for majority racial groups—
burdens that diffuse and concatenate across communities and generations. It is on this basis,
I think, that it is plausible to characterize the contemporary American criminal justice
system as “a systematic and institutional phenomenon that reproduces racial inequality and
the presumption of black and brown criminality.”283
This account of racial equity in criminal justice does not hinge on the presence of
discriminatory animus at any specific point in policing or the adjudicative process. Of
course, disparate racial treatment happens (probably quite often).284 But this account of
racial equity is forward looking and consequentialist insofar as it is trained on the ways in
which systems reproduce practical socioeconomic stratification over time. Moreover, this
account suggests that criminal justice institutions are not presently socially efficient. Their
footprint could be diminished in ways that do not create social costs from more crime. At
present, however, the inefficiently large costs of criminal justice (which are not justified
by sufficient offsetting social benefit) fall disproportionately on racial minorities. Many
reforms that increase social efficiency will also further racial equity as a result.
A possible counter-argument is that a particular quantum of state coercion will,
ceteris paribus, be more costly for a member of a white majority than a black minority
because whites’ greater wealth and more remunerative employment outcomes mean that
their economic losses from even transient coercion or incapacitation are likely to be
279
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greater than those of African-Americans.285 I am skeptical. I find it troubling to use racial
stratification by wealth and income as a lever to discount the costs imposed on AfricanAmericans. I also do not accept that the implicit metric at work in this analysis (in effect,
the capacity to pay) tracks a normatively attractive species of welfare. Finally, I have
already flagged negative externalities to the status of African-Americans as a group, and
to communities and families, that simply have parallel for racial majorities. I think it is
more likely that black communities and families will want for the social and financial
buffers that mitigate the shock of criminal-justice contacts. Hence, I think this counterargument is both empirically and normatively flawed.
B.

A Racial Equity Principle for (Algorithmic) Criminal Justice

The algorithmic tools described in Part I are mechanisms to allocate coercion within
the criminal justice system. As part of that system, they should be evaluated by the same
criteria that are applied to other parts of the system. That is, the introduction of new
computational and epistemic technologies does not alter the basic stakes of racial equity.
In this light, the key question for racial equity is whether the costs that an
algorithmically driven policy impose upon a minority group outweigh the benefits accruing
to that group. If an algorithmic tool generates public security by imposing greater costs (net
of benefits) for blacks as a group, it raises a racial equity concern. That policy undermines
racial equity by deepening the causal effect of the criminal justice system on race-based
social stratification. 286 This test is consequentialist. It focuses on the effects of an
algorithm’s use.287 It is holistic. Unlike older risk assessment tools, it accounts for both the
benefits and the costs of intervention. And, to emphasize again, it is quite general: There
is no reason not to apply it to criminal justice more generally. I develop the test here
nevertheless because I am concerned with algorithmic tools. That test, indeed, is
particularly well suited for algorithmic tools, which can develop precise cut-points for
using coercion based on analyses of large volumes data.
This standard has a distant kinship to John Rawls’ difference principle, which holds
that “[a]ll differences in wealth and income, should work for the good of the least
favored.”288 But the principle offered here operates within a much narrower institutional
scope (criminal justice alone) and is justified on more specific grounds—i.e., to ensure that

285

Cedric Herring and Loren Henderson, Wealth inequality in Black and White: Cultural and structural
sources of the racial wealth gap, 8 RACE & SOC. PROB. 4, 4-5 (2016).
286
This standard is analytically distinct from disparate impact as conventionally understood, not least
because it does not account for benefits for a policy for those beyond the burdened group. It is an
interesting question whether disparate impact, especially as applied to state action, might be reconfigured to
approach the standard suggested in the text.
287
Note that it is possible to take the view that there is a nonconsequentialist obligation on the state’s part
to show equal regard for all its citizens, and to think that my consequentialist metric is a way of honoring
that obligation.
288
John Rawls, Distributive Justice: Some Addendum, in COLLECTED PAPERS 154 (Samuel Freeman, ed.,
1999). Rawls formulated the difference principle in a number of different ways. Nothing here rests on those
variations, so I ignore them.
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institutions purportedly operating in furtherance of public safety are not doing so in a
fashion that exacerbates differences in racial strata.
What, though, of animus? Of course, individual officials do act at times with an
invidious state of mind. 289 At present, the institutional process of adjudication and the
doctrines structuring inquiries into bad intent ensure that few such instances are ever
brought to light, let alone used as a basis for constitutional relief.290 Still, I am skeptical
that the resulting harms are of the same magnitude as the damage that comes from criminal
justice’s effect on racial stratification. Even if Equal Protection doctrine were more
effective at identifying instances of bad motivation, a criminal-justice system purged of
animus would still have substantial ramifications for racial stratification. It is the existence
of racial stratification, moreover, and the channeling of anxieties about security and
difference into racialized forms, that plausibly drive much animus in the first instance.
Addressing stratification, on this view, is a more enduring and effective means of
regulating animus than the emaciated and enfeebled investigative doctrinal instruments the
Court permits.291
There are two ways of analyzing the relevant costs and benefits of an
algorithmically allocated coercive measure. Application of the proposed racial equity
criterion will produce a policy that enhances net social welfare on either of these two
approaches. The first is to focus solely on the immediate costs and benefits of a coercive
intervention, and to ignore externalities. This is a plausible approach with serious crimes,
where externalities are dwarfed by immediate costs and benefits. A second approach
accounts for both immediate costs and also externalities for different groups. The latter
take many forms, including the effect of high incarceration rates on black communities and
children, and the social signification of race as a marker of criminality. But as I argued
above, the evidence summarized above suggests that these impacts are felt principally by
members of racial minorities. It is, moreover, plausible to hypothesize that these spillover
costs will largely be experienced by members of the same racial group as the suspect given
persisting patterns of racial residential segregation. 292 Hence, the spillover costs of
coercion of minority individuals for the minority group will be greater on a per capita basis
than the costs of coercing majority group members. If the costs of coercing minorities are
larger, while benefits remain static, racial justice will be satisfied by an algorithmic tool
that imposed a higher threshold for black suspects than for white suspects. For less serious
crimes, moreover, these spillover effects may be similar in magnitude to the direct benefits
and costs of coercion. Hence, a simplified analysis that ignores spillovers would be
inappropriate. Rather, a bifurcated rule with different thresholds for whites and blacks may
be necessary to ensure that minority coercion does not exacerbate racial stratification for
less serious offenses.
289

For evidence of that effect, see CHARLES EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, & DONALD HAIDERMARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 117-18 (2014).
290
For an extended argument to this effect, see Huq, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 40, at 21-36.
291
Id.
292
Matthew Hall, Kyle Crowder, and Amy Spring, Neighborhood foreclosures, racial/ethnic transitions,
and residential segregation, AM. SOC. REV. 526, 527 (2015) (“[T]he modal experience for blacks (and
Hispanics) in U.S. cities is high residential segregation.”).
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Under either of these approaches, it will often be the case that racial equity and
social efficiency (in the sense of ensuring that immediate social benefits exceed immediate
social costs) will align. For example, when a majority group does not benefit from a policy,
or when its net gain is less than the costs imposed on the minority group—and the latter
suffers a net loss—that policy is socially inefficient. Equity and efficiency therefore align.
This approach makes certain simplifying assumptions. I believe them to be
plausible. Hence, it assumes that most crime is intraracial such that costs and benefits do
not cross the color line by and large. Obviously, this is not always true. But it does hold as
a general matter. 293 Moreover, my analysis assumes away a number of unusual
circumstances in which racial equity and social efficiency come apart. Because these
circumstances are rare, I do not dwell on them. I mention two here briefly. First, it is
possible that a policy benefits both the minority and the majority group, but the former
benefit less than the latter. As a result of this gap, the extent of racial stratification increases
even as the minority is benefited. The evaluation of such a policy would turn, in my view,
on the magnitude of social gain and the extent to which the policy generated stratification.
I do not think a general conclusion is appropriate regarding such policies.
Second, net gains from a policy for a majority group may exceed the net cost
imposed on a minority group. (Imagine, for example, a national security policy that
generated significant results by imposing crushing burdens on a very small ethnic or
religious minority.) In this case, there is a tension between efficiency and
antidiscrimination. Such conflicts have generated conflict among scholars.294 In the crime
control context, I suspect that this will rarely occur given the intra-group nature of much
crime. Yet my own view is that gains in net social welfare should generally not be obtained
by imposing burdens on minority groups subject to wider dynamics of compounding
subordination.295 In effect, such a policy would yield a regressive wealth transfer from
blacks to whites in which the former pay for the security enjoyed by the latter.296 I would
hence prioritize the distribution that resulted from a policy over the sheer quantity of social
welfare it yielded, at least in the absence of catastrophic general welfare losses from
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See Robert M. O'Brien, The Interracial Nature of Violent Crimes: A Reexamination, 91 AM. J. SOC. 817,
818-19 (1987) (finding evidence that crime is more intraracial that would be anticipated).
294
Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 82, 821-251 (2000) (favoring
welfare maximization), with Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law
and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1129, 1170 (2016) (doubting this maxim).
295
This view implies that consequences are morally salient, but that welfare maximization is not the only
measure of such consequences. The basic arrangements of a society are also important, and sometimes
merit protection or improvement even at the cost of net social welfare. For a different view, that turns
solely on purpose, and seems unconcerned with consequences, see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107
YALE L.J. 427, 440–41 (1997) (“A law whose express purpose is racial apartheid or expulsion is
unconstitutional per se, because racial purification of society is an objective that no legislature can pursue
under the Fourteenth Amendment-- period.”).
296
Cf. Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Algorithmic Road Map to Examine
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 4 SCIENCE, TECH. & HUMAN VALUES
118, 123 (2016) (noting the possibility that an algorithm can “enable[] transfers that systematically harm
minorities and other protected groups).
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forbearance. I do not perceive any circumstances in which that latter exception plausibly
applies.297
C.

Benchmarks for Algorithmic Discrimination

A large computer-science literature on algorithmic design has generated a plethora
of definitions of ‘algorithmic fairness’ and ‘algorithmic discrimination.’ One count finds
twenty-one definitions.298 Not all are relevant in the criminal justice context. Not every
concept is analytically distinct from all others. My aim in this section is to home in upon
the most relevant subset of such definitions, and to develop a quadripartite taxonomy of
potential metrics for gauging racial equity. Stated otherwise, what follows is a synthesis
and simplification of a much larger technical literature—a synthesis written with the aim
of practical application in mind.
I begin by sketching the four most salient metrics in the literature. 299 These can be
summarized as follows: One might first simply look at whether equal fractions of each
racial group are labeled as risky—such that they will be subject to additional policing or
detention. A similar, although not identical, analysis where risk is measured as a continuous
variable without a threshold for coercive action would look for equal average risk scores
across different racial groups. Second, one might ask whether the same classification rule
is being used to assign racial groups to the high-risk category. This condition is satisfied if
the same numerical risk score is used as a cut-off for all groups. Third, one might separate
each racial group and then look at the rate of false positives conditional on being
categorized as high risk. And fourth, one might separate each racial group and ask how
frequent false positives are conditional on being in fact a non-risky person. In the literature,
this has been characterized as a consideration of the population of those who in fact will
not engage in subsequent criminal conduct within a racial group, and an inquiry into what
proportion of that subset were erroneously categorized as warranting coercion.

297

Minority politicians and police chiefs have at times believed that a disproportionate policing focus on
African-Americans was warranted in terms of community self-preservation—a belief that the “accumulated
impact” of harsh antinarcotics measures has over time shown to be erroneous. JAMES FORMAN JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 124-48, 218 (2017) (documenting
these calls). If they had been correct—and Forman persuasively suggests that they were wrong on the
facts—then this would have justified a less demanding risk threshold for blacks than for whites.
298
See Arvind Narayan, “21 Definitions of Fairness and their Politics,” YouTube, Mar. 1, 2018,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jIXIuYdnyyk.
299
There are different enumerations of competing definitions of algorithmic fairness in criminal justice in
particular. Richard Berk and his co-authors identify six different definitions. Berk et al, Fairness in
Criminal Justice, supra note 253, at 13. They do not include one of the definitions I consider. Another
paper by Sam Corbett-Davies and colleagues (including me) identifies three definitions that are salient to
criminal justice policy. Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic decision making and the cost of fairness, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY
AND DATA MINING 797, 798 (2017). In addition, Feldman et al. define fairness as the inability to predict a
trait from the execution of an algorithmic function. Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Removing
Disparate Impact, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 259, 265 (2015), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2783311.
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The four concepts of fairness or nondiscrimination are summarized in Table 1,
which pairs each conception to the relevant parameter (or variable) that is to be equalized.
Table 1: Conceptions of Nondiscrimination in Algorithmic Criminal Justice
Conception of Fairness
Statistical parity
Single threshold
Equally precise
coercion
Predictive error
equality

Parameter that should be
equalized
Proportion of each group subject
to coercion
Treatment of equally risky persons
within each group
Proportion of those ranked as
risky who are erroneously
classified
Proportion of innocent persons
that are subject to coercion

Table 1 is intended to capture the range of core conceptions of nondiscrimination that
should matter in the criminal justice context. It does not, as I have already noted, capture
the full range of potential conceptions. For instance, one recent survey additionally flags
the idea of treatment equality,300 which looks simply at the ratio of false positives to false
negatives for a given racial group. To date, however, the latter concept has not played a
large role in debates about racial equity. My analysis does not suggest that it should—and
hence I leave it to one side for present purposes.
Figure 1 below helps clarify these four concepts. It displays the risk ranking
assigned by an algorithm—represented as a continuous variable of two groups, white and
black. The x-axis represents the risk value assigned to members of the population; the yaxis represents the frequency with which members of the group are assigned to a risk level.
For the purposes of this analysis, I assume that the training data used to generate the risk
assessments is not flawed, and in particular is not biased in ways that result in whites or
blacks being subject to disproportionate coercion. I make this assumption so as to enable a
narrow focus on the question whether the algorithmic classification rule standing on its
own presents a question of racial justice.
The graphic also contains a vertical line to represent the cut-off point for the
purposes of allocating coercion. Those who fall to the right of this threshold are subject to
the coercive treatment (either a policing or a detention-related intervention), while those
who are to the left of the threshold are not subject to any coercion. The parts of the curve
that represent populations that will be coerced (assuming the algorithm’s recommendations
are followed) are represented with colored blocks in the graphic. The proportion of the
white and the black populations being subject to coercion is a function of the area under
the respective curve to the right of the threshold.

300

Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 253, at 14.
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This form of graphical representation has a number of advantages. In using a
continuous variable, and in capturing the way in which a threshold will distinguish between
populations that are themselves quite internally varied in terms of their riskiness, this chart
captures some of the key features of criminal justice algorithms in practice. In particular,
it captures the fact that a decision must be taken about who the marginal person on the risk
curve is who should be detained. It also captures the intuition that the risk curves for
different racial groups might diverge.301

301

An alternative used in the literature is a confusion table, which is a two-by-two matrix that distributes
individuals in terms of whether they ultimately committed acts justifying coercion, and whether they were
in fact coerced. See, e.g., Tom Fawcett, An Introduction to ROC Analysis, 27 PATTERN RECOGNITION
LETTERS 861, 862 (2006) (describing the use of confusion matrices). Confusion tables, however do not
capture all the information that an algorithm generates—such as the variance in risk values—and relies on
knowledge that a decision maker by construction does not know at the time the relevant decision has to be
made—i.e., whether a suspect or a defendant in fact will go on commit a crime or impose a harm on others
in the future. Confusion tables hence omit useful information, while including information that cannot
plausibly inform the decision whether to coerce or not. They are non-ideal instruments for exploring
algorithmic fairness because the latter is a standard that has to be applied at the moment the algorithm is
used—and not later, once new information about potential states of the world has become available.
Moreover, confusion tables fail to distinguish the average person subject to coercion from the
marginal subject of coercion. For example, imagine a single decision rule (say, a risk threshold of 10%) is
applied to both a white and a black population. The white population comprises some with a 1% chance of
carrying contraband, and some with a 75% chance. The black population comprises some with a 1%
chance, and some with a 50% chance. A confusion table draws attention to the fact that the proportion of
stops that are ‘false positives’ for the white group will be one-half that for the black group (i.e., 25% rather
than 50%), but without elucidating whether this is a function of (a) a biased decision rule, or (b) a neutral
and justified decision rule being applied to different distributions of rule in the population. See Camelia
Simon, Sam Corbett-Davies, and Sharad Goel, The Problem of Infra-Marginality in Outcome Tests for
Discrimination, 11 ANN. APP. STAT. 1193, 1194 (2017) (setting out example); see also Ayres, supra note
245, at 131. This confusion, ironically, is avoided by foregoing the use of confusion tables.
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Figure 1: Hypothetical risk distributions for white and black populations
Frequency
White

Black

Risk
In Figure 1, the tails of the curve for the black population are to the right of those for the
white population. This means that the algorithm assigns in general higher risk values to
black than white persons in the population. If the risk distributions of both populations are
equal, no interesting question of racial equity or discrimination would arise from its
functioning: White and black outcomes would not be distinct. This element of the
hypothetical is not meant to imply that blacks in fact are more likely to commit crimes than
whites. It is rather to present a situation that is plausible, and that presents most sharply the
questions of racial equity that are of interest here.
The four conceptions of algorithmic fairness, or algorithmic nondiscrimination can
be elaborated as follows. First, an algorithmic classifier might exhibit statistical parity.
This means that an equal proportion of members of each group are subject to coercion. In
terms of the graphic, this means that the areas under the white and the blacks curves to the
right of the threshold are equal to each other.302 This can happen, it is worth noting, even
if there is wide variation in the ratio of false positives to true positives for whites and for
blacks. Where there is no threshold, one might instead use the average risk score for a given
group. A variant on statistical parity is “conditional statistical parity,” which requires that,
having controlled for a “limited set of ‘legitimate’ risk factors, an equal proportion of
defendants within each race group.” 303 In practice, however, this definition is highly
sensitive to what counts as a “legitimate” risk factor. Because my analysis does not assume
an answer to the question of what counts as a legitimate risk factor, I must put aside here
the possibility of conditional statistical parity.
302

Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 299, at 2; see also Dwork et al., note 246, at 7 (defining statistical
parity in terms of the fact that “an individual observed a particular outcome provides no information as to
whether the individual is a member of S or a member of T”); id. at 11-15 (developing a concept of fairness
that maximizes statistical parity while at the same time observing the constraint that otherwise similar
people be treated alike).
303
Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 299, at 2.
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Statistical parity is a clear and simple idea. Indeed, it is employed as part of the
prima facie case in disparate impact analysis in employment discrimination law.304 Under
longstanding administrative agency construction, a racial difference in selection rates of
“greater than four-fifths” is “generally” taken as evidence of “adverse impact.”305 On the
other hand, there is no abstract or a priori reason why state coercion should be equally
distributed among racial groups. To be sure, there is some evidence that at least for certain
sorts of offenses, such as narcotics crimes, there is “no statistically significant differences”
in offending rates for different racial and ethnic groups.306 But on the assumption that the
algorithm’s training data are not flawed, the hypothetical would simply not capture such
cases.
Second, an algorithmic classifier might be viewed as fair if it treated two people
who evinced the same ex ante evidence of risk, and differed by race, in the same way. The
computer science literature has distinguished between a single threshold and “multiple
race-specific thresholds.”307 A recent paper further offers a formal proof to the effect that
the “immediate utility” of a decision rule—defined in terms of the immediate benefits of
crime directly suppressed and direct costs of coercion (and ignoring externalities)—is
typically optimized by maintaining a single threshold rule for coercion, rather than having
plural thresholds.308 That is, a social planner with an algorithmic tool that is trained on
unbiased data would select a single risk threshold for both whites and blacks if she wished
to optimize over the costs and benefits of crime control. This analysis of social welfare,
however, does not answer the question of what necessarily furthers racial equity under all
conditions. In particular, it is important to observe that the formal proof of optimality is
limited to the immediate effects of an algorithmic tool, rather than its indirect effects.
Racial stratification is plausibly understood to be a compounding effect of the latter
concept, rather than something captured by the former.
This conception of fairness in algorithmic criminal justice has not so far attracted a
distinctive label. Indeed, some accounts of discrimination in the algorithmic context simply
do not cite this kind of fairness, preferring to focus on the relative frequency of false (or
true) positives (or negatives) in the two racial groups.309 In other work, this conception has
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See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977).
305
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2016) (“A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded
by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate
will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.”); see also
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (endorsing this four-fifths rule).
306
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use
and Health: Summary of National Findings 25 (2013),
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHresults2013
.pdf.
307
Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 299, at 8.
308
Id. at 3-6.
309
See, e.g., Berk et al, Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 253, at 13 (not mentioning this kind of
fairness in a six-fold taxonomy).
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been characterized simply as “fairness,”310 but that nomenclature is probably too vague to
be helpful. I label this definition, therefore, the ‘single threshold’ definition of algorithmic
fairness. Graphically, the single threshold definition of fairness is represented by the fact
that the vertical line that marks the threshold between coercion and its absence is in the
same place for both racial groups. If the vertical thresholds were placed in different
locations on the x-axis, there would be a group of individuals between the two thresholds
who would present the same evaluated risk, but would be treated differently solely on
account of their race.
A third conception of algorithmic nondiscrimination examines only the portion of
the population that lies to the right of the risk threshold. In Figure 1, this comprises the
shaded areas under the curves. These capture the parts of the white and the black population
subject to coercion as a consequence of the algorithm’s recommendations. Not all of these
recommendations, however, will be borne out by future events. In the bail context, for
example, some fraction of those subject to state coercion would not have gone on to commit
crimes that justified pretrial detention. They will, in other words, be ‘false positives.’ One
way of thinking about nondiscrimination is in terms of the false positive error rate
conditional on being assigned state coercion by the algorithm (which can also be stated as
P(innocent|high risk)). So if a greater fraction of blacks stopped or detained turn out to be
innocent in the relevant sense than the same fraction of ‘innocent’ whites, then this would
violate the third conception of fairness. Or (stated in yet another form) if the proportion of
those ‘false positives’ under the black curve to the right of the risk threshold is greater than
the proportion of ‘false positives’ under the white curve to the right of the threshold, then
this conception of equality is violated.311 This notion is captured by a number of different
terms in the computer science literature. A leading group of analysts label it conditional
use accuracy.312 In my view, it is simplest to label it “equally precise coercion” because
this conception is centrally concerned with the rate at which false positives occur
conditional on the fact of being coerced.313
Equally precise coercion played a role in the debate over the Compas algorithm.314
Responding to Pro Publica’s allegations of racial disparity, the Northpointe company
focused on the fact that the rate of error among the black and white groups subject to
coercion was the same.315 In effect, the Northpointe argument was that so long as equally
precise coercion obtained, there was no discrimination problem.
The fourth and final conception of fairness in the algorithmic context also focuses
on false positives, but from a different angle. Rather than the subset subject to coercion, it
310

Dwork et al., supra note 246, at 2.
This conception is focused not on the absolute number of false positives but rather than percentage of
those subject to coercion within a racial group that would not have gone on to engage in socially
undesirable behavior. It would be perverse to define fairness in terms of a parameter that was driven
primarily by the relative size of the two groups under study.
312
Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 253, at 14.
313
Precision is the term used by machine leaning specialists, who perceive the term “accurate” to imply a
normative judgment. I am grateful to Sharad Goel for discussion of this point.
314
See supra text accompanying notes 13 to 21.
315
Dietrich et al., supra note 19, at 3.
311
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focuses on the subset who would not go on to commit a crime or violent act. This subset
of ‘actually innocent’ persons is used as a denominator. For a numerator, it asks what
fraction of that subpopulation is incorrectly subject to coercion. In the bail context, for
example, this means asking whether “among those defendants who would not have gone
on to commit [a violation], detention rates are equal across race groups.”316 In other words,
conditional on being ‘innocent’ (in whatever sense of that term is relevant), the rate of
erroneous false positives across racial groups does not vary (or P(high risk|innocent)). This
conception of equality is not easy to capture using Figure 1, since the baseline category of
the ‘actually innocent’ are dispersed on both sides of the risk thresholds. In effect, it
comprises a diffused subset of whites and blacks who in fact would not commit actions
that justify coercion. This conception of fairness requires that we look for the proportion
of that actually innocent subset to the right of the risk threshold. If one racial group’s ratio
is larger than the other’s, there is reason for concern on this theory.
This conception has attracted a wide variety of labels, including “predictive
equality,”317 “conditional procedural accuracy,”318 and “equalized odds.”319 Another group
of analysts use the label “balance for the positive class” for a related concept.320 Their paper
also mentions the concept of “balance for the negative class” to capture the symmetrical
idea that “the assignment of scores shouldn’t be systematically more inaccurate for
negative instances in one group than another.”321 Deviating from my own past usage,322 I
will use the label predictive error equality here to capture the idea that what is at stake in
this fourth definition of nondiscrimination is the notion that the burden placed on the
innocent subset of each racial group should be the same. Predictive error equality is the
focus of the Pro Publica critique of the Compas algorithm: The journalistic organization
demonstrated, that is, that the proportion of ‘innocent’ black defendants recommended for
detention by the Compas algorithm was substantially higher than the proportion of innocent
white defendants subject to the same recommendation.323 In effect, Pro Publica implicitly
leveraged the intuition that what matters with an algorithm is what happens to the ‘actually
innocent.’ If the treatment of actual innocents varies across racial groups, Pro Publica’s
argument went, an algorithm could not be ranked as nondiscriminatory.
D.

Prioritizing Conceptions of Algorithmic Discrimination

The range of possible ways of operationalizing the quality of nondiscrimination in
the algorithmic criminal justice context raises the question of how to evaluate and rank the
316

Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 299, at 2.
Id.
318
Berk et al, Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 253, at 13-14.
319
Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS (2016), http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6373-equality-of-opportunity-insupervised-learning.
320
Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan & Manish Raghavan, Inherent trade-offs in the fair determination
of risk scores 4, 9 (2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807 (Labeling this concept as “[c]alibration within
groups”).
321
Id.
322
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four main competing conceptions. My aim in this section is twofold. First, I point to results
in the technical literature that demonstrate the impossibility of pursuing all these
conceptions of nondiscrimination simultaneously. Second, I offer my own normative
account of which conception to prioritize. This account, detailed above, hinges on the
minimization of costs net of benefits for the minority group. Contrary to both Northpointe
and Pro Publica, this contends that rates of false positives (whatever denominator is used)
are not compelling normative benchmarks. Instead, the analysis should focus on whether a
minority risk threshold yields net costs or benefits for that group. Where there are no
spillovers, it is likely that the same threshold will obtain for both minority and majority
groups. Where there are large and asymmetric spillovers, both social efficiency and racial
equity are served by different thresholds.
1.

Conflicts Between Algorithmic Fairness Definitions

It would seem desirable to satisfy all these definitions of equality. At least at first
blush, all capture colorable and important intuitions about the fair allocation of coercion.
But matters are not so simple. It turns out that this is not possible in many cases—and not
possible under conditions that are reasonably likely to occur in practice—for two reasons.
First, it will generally be the case that statistical parity cannot be achieved using a
single threshold. This is readily apparent from Figure 1, which illustrates the case in which
the risk distributions of racial groups vary. When this happens, it will always be the case
that a single risk threshold will subject different proportions of each group to coercion.
Hence, it is not possible—assuming differences in the distributions of risk between the two
racial populations—to have both a single threshold and also statistical parity.
Second, it will generally be the case that it is also impossible to achieve both equally
precise coercion and predictive error equality. This impossibility result holds under two
conditions. First, it must be the case that the base rates of criminality are different for the
two racial groups. Second, it also must be the case that there is no function that allows for
“perfectly accurate classification” (a condition also known as “separation”).324 Under these
conditions, “one cannot have both conditional use accuracy equality and equality in the
false negative and false positive rates,” where the latter term is simply conditional
procedural accuracy.325 It is for this reason that assessments of the Compas algorithm have
diverged. On the one hand, the original criticism of the algorithm focused on the difference
in the rate of conditional procedural errors for blacks and whites.326 On the other hand, the
defenses of Northpointe’s instrument focused on the fact that it was calibrated within the
categories of risk—i.e., the conditional use error rate was equal for both whites and
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blacks.327 Neither side recognized that given the possibility of underlying differences in
the empirical characteristics of racial groups, and absent separation, these two metrics of
algorithmic fairness were bound, mathematically, to diverge under plausible conditions.328
A choice therefore must be made about which conception of nondiscrimination to
pursue. The computer-science literature, while helpful in defining the range of possible
conceptions of algorithmic nondiscrimination, is less helpful in evaluating and ranking
those definitions.
2.

The Irrelevance of False Positive Rates

Two of the four definitions of algorithmic nondiscrimination developed above—
equally precise coercion and predictive error equality—focus on the rate of false positives.
These two definitions differ, however, in terms of their denominator, which is alternatively
(1) being coerced, or (2) being ‘actually innocent.’ False-positive focused definitions not
only played a central role in the debate between Northpointe and Pro Publica,329 they have
also infiltrated public debate more broadly.330 A concern with false positives is not without
normative appeal. But definitions of nondiscrimination that hinge on false positive rates do
not index in any obvious fashion the extent to which an algorithmic instrument exacerbates
racial stratification. This section is hence directed at ruling out two of the four possible
metrics of racial equity that have attracted the most public attention to date.
For four interrelated reasons, the temptation to focus on false positives should be
resisted. First, the criminal-justice decisions subject to algorithmic resolution are all made
in advance of potential adverse actions. A stop is conducted, bail is denied, or a sentence
is extended, that is, before the state knows, or can know, whether a suspect or defendant
will in fact commit a criminal act. Officials using an algorithm, therefore, cannot know
who is a true positive and who is a false positive among the pool of persons to the right of
the vertical threshold illustrated in Figure 1. Even if we assume that an official responsible
for applying the algorithm knows the general shape of the distribution (for example, as
illustrated in Figure 1), she does not and cannot know whether a particular suspect is in
fact going to inflict harm; all she knows is how the algorithm has ranked that person. A test
for nondiscrimination that distinguishes false positives from true positives relies on
information that is not available to that official. And it is not at all clear why the failure to
account for information that the official or algorithm cannot access should be treated as a
failure. Provided that the decision rule otherwise achieves valued public goals at the lowest
collateral cost, that is, it is not clear why the (ordinarily unknown) distribution of false
positives should matter.
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Second, the law itself has a very high tolerance for false positives. In the policing
and the pretrial detention contexts in particular, the law is willing to tolerate a very high
level of false positives on the ground that the gains to crime suppression offset the costs of
that high rate of false positives. Hence, in the policing context a mere showing of
“reasonable articulable suspicion,” which is far less than probable cause, is enough to
warrant a street stop.331 In the bail context, the standard for detention under federal law is
framed in terms of reasonableness and envisages substantial room for error. 332 But
disparities in the allocation of state-created goods (or bads) are generally thought to be
worrisome if those goods are important. This, I think, explains the coverage of housing and
employment opportunities by disparate impact regimes.333 Moreover, if the law takes the
view that there is no reason for concern at the prospect at absolutely high levels of stops or
pretrial bail detentions, it is not clear that the law contains the normative resources to
establish concern when those resources are allocated in subtly disparate ways—especially
if the overall pattern of stops redounds to the net benefit of the society, and also of the
subordinated group.334
Third, a failure of equally precise coercion or of predictive error equality is a
mathematical function of the use of a single threshold for risk to two racial groups with
different risk distributions.335 Given that relationship, it is necessary to choose between
unequal rates of false positives and different risk thresholds. Merely pointing to one form
of inequality is question-begging. If the risk threshold is set at the socially efficient level,
moreover, such that it optimizes over immediate costs and benefits for blacks as well as
whites, 336 equalizing false positives risks the imposition of unnecessary costs on the
minority group. Although not dispositive, it is worth noting that the disparate impact law
does not treat unavoidable disparities generated by the pursuit of a valid governmental
interest as cause for concern.337 At least where the state has no other means of suppressing
crime without a violation of equally precise coercion or of predictive error equality, it is
not obvious why the ensuing disparities should be treated as fatally problematic.
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Finally, and most importantly, if one is concerned with the impact of algorithmic
criminal justice on a stratified racial minority, it is not at all clear why the focus should
solely be on false positives. The negative expressive effects and social harms imposed by
criminal justice institutions upon African-American communities that are not merely
triggered by false positives. Directing coercion toward black suspects and defendants even
when such coercion is warranted can have an expressive effect on public beliefs about
black criminality and the same debilitating effects on communities, families, and children.
Indeed, there is no particular reason to believe that any of these spillover costs are less if
the person subject to the coercion is in fact a true rather than false positive. Put another
way, if you care about racial stratification, what should matter is the absolute cost of a
coercive tactic for minority, net of benefit, for all members of that racial group—whether
or not they ultimately would have acted in ways that justified coercion. Both kinds of stops
have costs; both count for the purposes of racial equity. True, those costs are offset when
an algorithm makes a correct prediction—but that is captured better by a focus on the
benefits of the coercive measure being allocated.338
For these four reasons, I do not think that either equally precise coercion or
predictive error equality provides an appropriate metric for thinking about racial equality
in this context. Rather, it is desirable in the end to know whether crime control is inflicting
more costs than benefits for the minority group as a whole—and not just those who would
otherwise not go on to inflict any social harm.
3.

Evaluating the Impact of Algorithmic Criminal Justice on Racial Stratification

So what does matter? The opening two movements of this Part mapped the effect
of criminal justice institutions on racial stratification, and charted a general principle of
racial equity. Existing criminal justice systems influence the extent of racialized social
stratification in society as a whole.339 Racial equity in criminal justice generally—and in
particular in the algorithmic context—should be primarily concerned with mitigating these
pernicious effects. It should repudiate the tight linkages that have bound criminal justice to
the reproduction of racial hierarchy since the beginning of the twentieth century. Even if
the present-day operation of criminal justice institutions cannot undue past harms, at a
minimum they should not compound those harms.
The question therefore is which of the available technical benchmarks best captures
this pathway between criminal justice and racial stratification. As argued above, an
appropriate benchmark would home in upon the net cost (benefit) of an algorithmic
criminal justice instrument for the racial minority in the socially subordinate position. A
measure of costs net of benefits for the racial minority is relevant morally because it
captures the extent to which a criminal justice measure depresses the social standing of the
minority group. In the context of black/white comparisons in the American context at least,
338
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this analysis is simplified by the fact that much violent crime is intraracial. That is, the
benefits of a crime suppression measure imposed on blacks are likely to accrue largely to
blacks (while the same is true for whites). The analysis would be more complex if we
assumed that the racial minority did not capture all or most of the benefits of crime
suppression targeting members of that minority.
In my view, there is no one metric developed in the computer science literature or
otherwise that captures this concern with racial stratification. Benchmarks that concern the
rate of false positives capture in a very loose way the magnitude of unjustified state
coercion. But they fail to acknowledge the state’s inability to distinguish justified from
unjustified exercises of coercion ex ante. Statistical parity does account for the aggregate
cost of coercion on a racial minority. But it does so only through a comparative lens. It
asks whether the minority is burdened more or less than a majority group. It also fails to
consider offsetting benefits to the minority group. Because most crime is intraracial, it fails
to account for the possibility that the benefits of crime suppression for blacks outweigh its
costs. A comparative measure such as statistical parity is at best considered an evidentiary
tool, therefore, rather than a direct measure of racial equity.
An inquiry into racial equity can usefully focus instead on the question whether the
marginal decision to impose coercion within the black population can be justified. I present
first a simple version of this inquiry that assumes that all costs and benefits are immediate,
and that there are no spillovers. Consider again Figure 1. Imagine sliding the threshold for
coercion for the minority population right from the y-axis. At first, the threshold would
assign for coercion many people for whom the immediate costs of such coercion
outweighed any benefit for the simple reason that their risk of causing harm was so low.
At some point in the rightward movement of the threshold, however, the immediate costs
of coercion would be balanced by its benefits. When the costs of this marginal decision to
coerce are outweighed by its benefits, the threshold has been calibrated such that no net
burden is being placed on the minority population, and all coercion generates a net gain for
that group. Assuming that most relevant crime is intraracial, this means that the marginal
benefits of coercion (for the black community) are greater than the costs of coercion (for
the black community). Such a policy leaves that racial group no worse off than it would
otherwise be.
For interventions that prevent serious crimes, there is no reason to think that the
immediate costs of coercion, or the immediate benefits of crime control, vary between
racial groups. Moreover, spillovers can be ignored because such costs are likely to be
rounding errors in relation to the costs of murder, sexual assault, armed robbery, and the
like. Such a tightly focused analysis might, for example, be appropriate in the analysis of
bail decisions where a suspect may go on to commit a serious violent crime. Under these
conditions, a single risk threshold calibrated to be socially optimal (in the sense of
eliminating cost-unjustified coercion) will satisfy racial equity. It will also be socially
efficient.
This goal has likely not been reached in practice. Even assuming that criminaljustice decision-makers are applying a single threshold rule (rather than being influenced
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by animus or racial stereotypes), it is very likely that many present uses of police coercion
and detention are unjustified. The benefits of state coercion are likely over-estimated, while
its costs are under-estimated. Consistent with this prediction, current risk-assessment tools
estimate the benefits of coercion but do not measure costs. 340 Still, the present lack of
empirical data on the costs and benefits of many familiar criminal justice institutions, such
as street stops and bail denials, means that this intuition is hard to substantiate. But the
available data suggests an excess of coercion beyond the socially optimal.341 When the
supernumerary costs of such coercion fall on racial minorities, they intensify racial
stratification. Ratcheting back the sheer volume of coercion, therefore, may be a first order
task in reform projects that have racial equity in mind.
This simple analysis of racial equity accounts only for the immediate costs and
benefits of coercion. It does not account, though, for the externalities set forth in Part III.A.
A more complex model of racial equity would account for all negative spillovers from
algorithmically allocated coercion. These externalities are substantially greater for racial
minorities than for the racial majority. They are also nontrivial in scale. Where less serious
crime is concerned (e.g., public order offenses), it is likely that these externalities are of
the same magnitude as the immediate benefits and costs of crime-control. Second-order,
downstream costs of coercion therefore cannot be safely ignored as rounding errors in an
analysis of the criminal justice system’s dynamic effects. The analysis for less serious
crime, or for interventions that do not impede serious harms, is hence different from the
analysis when serious social harm is directly at stake.
Accounting for the racially asymmetrical distribution of externalities alters the
racial-equity analysis. It means that the marginal costs of coercion are likely to be greater
for the racial minority. Accordingly, the point on the x-axis at which costs are equal to
benefits for the minority is to the right of the same break-even point for the majority group.
Because the operation of criminal-justice coercion, that is, generates asymmetrical harms
to black families and black communities, as well as exacerbating Kennedy’s racial tax,
there will be a class of crimes for which a greater benefit will be required to achieve net
positive effects for black suspects. And because the costs and benefits of crime are largely
intraracial, the same higher risk threshold will be required to achieve social efficacy.
Whether the focus is social efficiency or racial equity, this implies that the risk threshold
for blacks should be set at a higher level (i.e., farther to the right in Figure 1) than the
threshold for whites. Therefore, accounting for both the immediate and spillover costs of
crime control when its immediate benefits are small conduces to a bifurcated risk
threshold—one rule for the majority, and one for minority. The single vertical line in Figure
1 would bifurcate. The line for blacks would move rightward.
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This is akin to common affirmative action schemes, in which otherwise similar
black and white persons are treated differently because of the different spillover
consequences of their treatment. In the affirmative action context, the existence of a
positive diversity benefit (which is another kind of spillover) warrants a less stringent
threshold rule for assigning a benefit to the racial minority. 342 In the criminal justice
context, similarly, the existence of negative spillovers for black families and communities
warrants a more stringent risk threshold for the racial minority. The argument for a
bifurcated classification rule is arguably stronger here than the argument for affirmative
action: The alleviation of racial stratification, in my view, is a more acute interest than
diversity because it directly benefits the most marginalized (which affirmative action may
not) and immediately relieves stigmatic and material harms. Alleviating the effect of
accumulated disadvantage caused by the historical operation of criminal justice
institutions, in other words, is a more compelling goal than crafting a well-rounded
university.
Unlike affirmative action, however, the case for multiple risk thresholds can be
made independently on either racial equity or social efficiency grounds. So long as a
policy’s costs (benefits) are largely internalized by racial groups, and so long as costs are
greater at the margin for the minority group, a socially optimal rule would require different
risk thresholds. Where the state adopts a cost-benefit approach to criminal justice policy,343
an exacting approach to cost-benefit trades offs in crime control may in some cases
generate dual thresholds.344 In the algorithmic context, it is worth noting that a machinelearning tool given the necessary data and asked to vindicate social efficiency (understood
in a capacious sense that reached both static and dynamic effects) could converge on a
bifurcated rule absent race-conscious human decision-making.
However that goal is approached, its achievement imposes large new epistemic
burdens on the state. Whereas risk assessment in criminal justice to date has focused
narrowly on the costs of crime, a rigorously executed algorithmic method demands data on
the costs of crime control. This is not merely a matter of counting state expenditures, but
also measuring spillovers. This is a massive task. But its size and difficulty ought not to be
a justification for avoidance. The current dearth of information about the spillover costs of
criminal justice institutions, particularly for minority communities, is causally related to
their stratifying effects. Ignorance of spillovers, coupled to a myopic focus on a small
number of high-profile crimes, creates the epistemic background against which actually
existing state institutions compound racial stratification. That ignorance is thus a form of
“hermeneutical injustice,” in which “some significant area of one’s social experience [is]
obscured from collective understanding owing to persistent and wide-ranging
hermeneutical marginalization.” 345 Racial inequity cannot be justified by hermeneutic
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injustice. Precisely how the epistemic gap will be closer is a large question, and I do not
take it up here. But it is worth noting that the algorithmic tools mapped here may have a
role. Determining how ‘big data’ tools can contribute to this epistemic enterprise, indeed,
is perhaps the next technological frontier in criminal justice.
At the same time, a multiple threshold rule for different racial groups—runs
headlong into the anti-classification rule of Equal Protection doctrine.346 At a minimum, it
would receive strict scrutiny.347 As a result, a multiple threshold regime would be in serious
constitutional jeopardy. Under these conditions, which are hardly empirically implausible,
the regime imperiled by our constitutionality equality doctrine is the only one that both
mitigates racial stratification and also maximizes social welfare. Why would we want to
place that regime beyond reach? I can think of no good answer. Such a result, in my view,
hence tells us more about our wrongheaded equality doctrine than it does about the
substance of algorithmic criminal justice.
Conclusion
This revolution, when it comes, will be digitized. Algorithmic criminal justice
relying on first machine learning and then on deep learning, is only now beginning to
impinge on actual, existing criminal justice institutions. The latter have been enduring sites
for the production of racial stratification, not only in the form of a policing and carceral
apparatus that weighs most heavily on African-Americans but also in terms of a racial tax
that extends to all members of the group, whether or not they have any connection to
criminality.
Given this history, it seems to me important to get algorithmic criminal justice right.
Such tools, if fashioned wisely, might be useful in restoring equilibrium and mitigating
the burden of racial externalities. Wrongly configured, they may prove subtle levers for
preserving and exacerbating those burdens. My aim in this Article has been to demonstrate
that constitutional law does not contain effectual tools to meet these problems. It is a
mistake, therefore, to contort constitutional doctrine in the hope that it will do service in a
context where it is so substantially ill-fitted. Far better, in my view, to recognize that
constitutional law has almost nothing useful to say about what counts as a racially just
algorithm—and might instead achieve the remarkable double-header of impeding both
racial equity and social welfare maximization. The doctrine is thus a moral vacuity.
Reformulation of the doctrine, in my view, is desirable but unlikely. In the interim,
algorithm designers, local officials, and state legislators should instead ask directly how
best to achieve racial equity given the shape of existing criminal justice institutions and the
technical tools at their disposal. I have offered an answer to that question that draws on,
without quite tracking, existing technical definitions of algorithmic nondiscrimination. I
have further stressed that my approach has the distinctive feature of aligning racial equity
with social efficiency. My project has been demarcated in terms of algorithmic criminal
justice. But it should not escape notice that there is no particular reason to confine the scope
346
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of the analysis to algorithmic tools, or even to criminal justice. But those extensions are for
another day. For now, a recognition of the potential convergence of equity and efficiency
might move us closer to a remedy for the difficult, enduring, and damaging legacy of our
racialized criminal justice past.
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